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I. INTRODUCTION
In an earlier work,' I argued that Congress and federal courts either con-
sciously or unconsciously exhibited a bias in favor of people with certain
financial attributes (the "Ideal Debtor") in crafting the relief provided by the
federal Bankruptcy Code (the "Code") 2. After examining census and other
empirical data, I concluded that the Ideal Debtor is white and, for that reason,
race mattered in bankruptcy.3
On April 20, 2005, the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
Protection Act of ("BAPCPA") was signed into law and became fully effec-
tive for cases filed on or after October 17, 2005. 4 After considering bank-
ruptcy reform for almost a decade, Congress ultimately concluded that some
debtors were abusing bankruptcy laws by, among other things, discharging
debts they had the means to pay.5 To curb this perceived abuse, Congress
decided to radically overhaul the consumer provisions of the Code by gener-
ally making it harder for an opportunistic or "Abusive Debtor" to discharge
his debts. Given the sweeping nature of these changes, it is appropriate to
consider whether race matters in bankruptcy reform.
Part II of this Article briefly reviews the goals and structure of bank-
ruptcy relief. Part 1m1 describes the Ideal Debtor pre-BAPCPA and briefly
explains why, pre-BAPCPA, whites likely received the most benefits from
filing for bankruptcy. Part IV presents the "Abusive Debtor" profile that
caused Congress to enact BAPCPA; then, it briefly describes BAPCPA's
most significant changes to the existing consumer bankruptcy laws. Part V of
the Article briefly discusses how BAPCPA affects the pre-BAPCPA Ideal
Debtor; then, presents the demographic features of the debtor profile that
would be most harmed by BAPCPA. Part VI notes that the financial charac-
teristics attributed to the Abusive Debtor are more likely to be found in white
debtors. Indeed, despite the Code's general bias in favor of white debtors, a
hypothetical white debtor would be harmed more than a hypothetical minority
debtor by BAPCPA's most controversial provision (i.e. the means test) be-
cause whites have relatively higher incomes. Likewise, given their higher
home ownership rates, white homeowner debtors would be harmed more by
the limitations BAPCPA places on homestead exemptions and exemption
planning than minority debtors would.
1. A. Mechele Dickerson, Race Matters in Bankruptcy, 61 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1725 (2005) [hereinafter Race Matters 1].
2. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532 (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
3. See infra Section ElI.
4. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-
8, 119 Stat. 23.
5. H.R. REP. No. 109-31, pt. 1 (2005), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88; S.
REP. No. 105-253, at 23-26 (1998).
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Part VI observes, however, that other BAPCPA provisions widen the ra-
cial benefits gap, including those that make more student loan and family
support debts nondischargeable as well as giving more favorable treatment to
debtors who have interests in retirement accounts or who send their children
to private schools. Because even BAPCPA's supporters conceded that few
people would flunk the means test6 and because BAPCPA places only modest
restrictions on homeowners, the Article concludes by suggesting that bank-
ruptcy laws likely will continue to disproportionately benefit white debtors.
I. BANKRUPTCY RELIEF
A. Goals
Bankruptcy laws are designed to make sure that deserving (i.e. poor and
honest) debtors get a fresh financial start by discharging their debts, and that
creditors are treated fairly in an orderly debt resolution proceeding.7 Until
Congress enacted BAPCPA, consumers who sought bankruptcy relief had an
almost unfettered right to decide whether to attempt to repay their debts. That
is, consumers pre-BAPCPA could almost always choose whether to discharge
some debts while relinquishing all but exempt assets in Chapter 7 or dis-
charge significantly more debts, keep almost all assets (including those they
could not exempt) but attempt to repay at least some debts in Chapter 13. In
addition, most pre-BAPCPA debtors could decide whether to propose a three
or five year Chapter 13 repayment plan.
8
Debtors historically chose Chapter 13 over Chapter 7 if they wanted to
keep homes, cars, and other nonexempt assets.9 Because pre-BAPCPA debt-
ors had the right to decide whether to attempt debt repayment, a Chapter 7
debtor who theoretically had income that could be used to repay his debts in a
Chapter 13 proceeding was not required to do so. However, courts were not
completely powerless since they had the authority to curtail conduct they
found to be abusive. That is, pre-BAPCPA courts could dismiss Chapter 7
cases if they concluded that granting bankruptcy relief would be a "substan-
tial abuse" of the Code.'0 Pre-BAPCPA courts considered a number of factors
when deciding whether to dismiss a Chapter 7 case for substantial abuse. A
partial list includes the following: whether the debtor appeared to have in-
come sufficient to repay debts in Chapter 13, whether the debtor's proposed
6. See infra note 120.
7. Race Matters I, supra note 1, at 1727 (discussing dual goals).
8. However, the presumption, both in the Code and in practice, was that plans
would last no longer than three years. Id. at 1727-29 (summarizing debtors' choice
under pre-BAPCPA Code); 11 U.S.C. § 1322(d) (2000), amended by 11 U.S.C. §
1322(d) (Supp. V 2005) (statutory presumption of three year plan).
9. Race Matters I, supra note 1, at 1728.
10. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (2000), amended by 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (Supp. V 2005).
20061
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budget contained too many unnecessary, or any extravagant household ex-
penses, and whether the debtor wanted to use his income to provide support
for non-legal dependents such as adult children, parents, or grandchildren.
B. Treatment of Debts
Both the pre-BAPCPA and amended Code specify the order in which
debts will be paid and lists those debts that can never be discharged. Based
largely on policy grounds, the Code gives certain unsecured claims priority
treatment, including taxes, wage-related claims, and domestic support obliga-
tions, such as alimony and child support.' 2 Lawyers also receive favorable
treatment in bankruptcy cases since administrative expenses, which include
attorneys fees, have traditionally been entitled to payment before other unse-
cured claims. 13
Family support debts have always been a politically protected class of
debts. In addition to being a priority claim, most family support obligations
were presumptively nondischargeable pre-BAPCPA. While obligations and
payments "in the nature of support" could never be discharged, pre-BAPCPA
debtors could sometimes discharge nonsupport obligations ordered as part of
a divorce or separation.'
5
Pre-BAPCPA, student loans made or guaranteed by government units
were also presumptively nondischargeable in both Chapter 7 and 13.1 Stu-
dent loans could be discharged only if debtors could show that repaying the
debt would impose an "undue hardship" on them and their dependents. 17 Pre-
BAPCPA, courts typically refused to consider whether the debtor received
any legitimate educational benefits from the school (often a trade school) that
received his loan proceeds. Instead, if the court concluded that forcing the
debtor to repay the loan would not be an undue financial hardship, the loan
debt was nondischargeable even if the debtor received no marketable skills or
training from the school.' 8
11. Race Matters I, supra note 1, at 1729-30 (discussing factors courts consid-
ered when deciding whether a Chapter 7 filing was abusive); 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)
(2000), amended by 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (Supp. V 2005).
12. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a) (2000), amended by 11 U.S.C. § 507(a) (Supp. V 2005).
13. 11 U.S.C. § 503(b) (Supp. V 2005).
14. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (2000), amended by 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (Supp. V
2005).
15. Id. § 523(a)(15) (2000), amended by 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15) (Supp. V 2005).
Typically, payments "in the nature of support" are child support or alimony, and
many "nonsupport obligations" include equitable property distributions or obligations
arising from hold-harmless agreements.
16. Id. § 523(a)(8) (2000), amended by 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (Supp. V 2005).
17. Id.
18. See, e.g., Murphey v. Sallie Mae (In re Murphy), 305 B.R. 780, 791, 798
n.21 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2004) (rejecting the view that the "tangible benefit a debtor
[Vol. 71
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C. Treatment of Assets
While a Chapter 7 debtor's pre-petition assets can be used to pay credi-
tor claims, assets acquired after the bankruptcy petition is filed generally are
excluded from Chapter 7 estates.19 In contrast, post-petition assets - includ-
ing future wages - are included in Chapter 13 estates. In fact, most Chapter
13 debtors make the payments required by their repayment plans using post-
petition wages. 20 In effect, while a Chapter 13 debtor's tangible assets theo-
retically can be liquidated and used to repay his debts, Chapter 13 debtors
typically keep their present assets, exempt and non-exempt, and instead use
future income to repay their past debts.
Notwithstanding this broad, inclusive definition of estate property, the
pre-BAPCPA and existing Code categorically exclude certain types of prop-
erty from all debtors' bankruptcy estates. Bankruptcy laws allow debtors to
exempt property to ensure that debtors will not leave bankruptcy destitute.
Thus, debtors may keep all property - regardless of value - held in trust or
21subject to a restriction on transfer under applicable nonbankruptcy laws.
This allows a debtor who is the beneficiary of property held in a spendthrift
trust, or debtors who have interests in tax-qualified retirement plans that con-
tain transferability restrictions, as virtually all do, to keep those funds rather
than use the funds to pay creditor claims.
22
While the Code contains a uniform list of assets that are categorically
excluded from the debtor's estate, there is a wide disparity in the type and
amount of property individual debtors can exempt under either the federal
23bankruptcy or applicable state exemptions provisions. Because the public
policy of this country generally favors home ownership, the Code and almost
all state laws let debtors exempt at least a portion of the value of their home.
24
obtained from a student loan obligation" should be considered when deciding whether
to discharge the student loan debt). Cf Speer v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re
Speer), 272 B.R. 186, 192 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2001).
19. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2000).
20. Id. § 1306(a).
21. Id. § 541(c)(1).
22. Race Matters I, supra note 1, at 1735-36. A spendthrift trust is one that has
terms that prevent the beneficiary from assigning his interests to another party and
also prevent creditors from reaching his interests. AuSTIN WAKEMAN ScoTr &
WILLIAM FRANK N FRATCHER, 11A THE LAW OF TRUSTS 83 (4th ed. 1987). Typically,
the settlor creates a spendthrift trust to protect the beneficiary from his own folly,
inefficiency, or misfortune. Id.
23. This disparity occurs because Congress permits state legislators to decide
whether their residents can choose between bankruptcy or state exemption laws or
whether they must rely on the state exemptions. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (Supp. V 2005).
See generally Margaret Howard, Exemptions Under the 2005 Bankruptcy Amend-
ments: A Tale of Opportunity Lost, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 397, 398 (2005).
24. Race Matters I, supra note 1, at 1736 n.47.
2006]
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Indeed, a few states (including Florida and Texas) give debtors an almost
unlimited homestead exemption even if the home is expensive and they
bought the home immediately before filing for bankruptcy as part of pre-
filing "exemption planning. 25 Similarly, if allowed by the debtor's applica-
ble state exemption laws, the debtor can keep property he and his spouse own
as tenants by the entirety and the Code makes it harder to sell entirety prop-
erty even if it is nonexempt. Likewise if allowed by applicable state law, the
Code, both pre-BAPCPA and as amended, lets married debtors prevent credi-
tors from seizing entireties property regardless of its value.
26
Even if debtors do not own entireties property or cannot take an unlim-
ited homestead exemption, the pre-BAPCPA Code favored homeowner debt-
ors.27 For example, Chapter 13 debtors who were delinquent on their mort-
gage payments but had equity in their homes generally could use bankruptcy
28to keep their homes. Indeed, even if the mortgage holder accelerated the
mortgage loan and sued the debtor for the loan balance, mortgage holders
would find it difficult to foreclose on a Chapter 13 debtor's home if the
debtor kept current on her mortgage payments and agreed to cure the loan
default through the Chapter 13 plan.29 This favorable treatment for home-
owners is in stark contrast to the benefits bankruptcy laws give renter debtors.
That is, debtors who rent residential property typically will be evicted if they
fall behind on their rent payments unless they cure the default and give the
landlord assurances that there will be no future defaults. 30
D. Costs
It is virtually impossible for debtors to discharge their debts in bank-
ruptcy without incurring some expenses. Though litigants in almost every
other judicial setting had been allowed to file in forma pauperis for years,
pre-BAPCPA debtors were forced to pay filing fees. 31 By making all debtors
pay the filing fee, Congress effectively deemed some poor people to be too
poor to file for bankruptcy.32 Though most localities have always had pro
25. Id. at 1736. See also 151 CONG. REc. S2462-02, 2467 (2005) (statement of
Sen. Lautenberg), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getpage.cgi?dbname= 2005_record&page=S2467&position=all (suggesting that
BAPCPA "protects the mansions of multimillionaires who file for bankruptcy protec-
tion but makes it easier for landlords to evict tenants from their homes").
26. Race Matters I, supra note 1, at 1736-37.
27. Id. at 1737.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. In pre-BAPCPA Chapter 7 cases, curing the default had to occur within
sixty days after the case was filed. Id. at 1737-38.
31. 28 U.S.C. § 1930(a) (2000), amended by 28 U.S.C. § 1930(a) (Supp. V
2005).
32. Race Matters I, supra note 1, at 1741.
[Vol. 71
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bono bankruptcy programs or other free legal services, those services gener-
ally were made available only for debtors whose wages were being or likely
would be garnished or those who had nonexempt property that could be
seized.33
Given the scarcity of free legal assistance, pre-BAPCPA debtors could
expect to pay attorney's fees ranging from $400 to $1,750 in Chapter 7 cases
and $400 to $3,000 in Chapter 13 cases. 34 These fees would be higher if debt-
ors went to see the lawyer before filing for bankruptcy exemption planning
advice, i.e. advice on how to convert non-exempt assets into exemptible
property or to otherwise maximize their available exemptions in bankruptcy.
In addition, while debtors can pay their Chapter 13 attorney's fees through
their plans, Chapter 7 debtors are almost always forced to pay their attorneys
before the case is filed. Attorneys who handle Chapter 7 cases traditionally
demanded payment upfront because the vast majority of Chapter 7 cases are
administratively insolvent and, thus, lacked funds to pay any unsecured
claims, including their attorneys' fees.35 Indeed, anecdotal evidence suggests
that pre-BAPCPA Chapter 7 debtors purportedly were advised to borrow
money from friends or relatives or not pay other bills to be sure they had
enough money to pay their attorney and the mandatory filing fees.36
III. THE IDEAL DEBTOR
Everyone who files for bankruptcy generally receives some debt relief.
But, as I discussed in Race Matters I, debtors who had certain types of debts,
assets, and other economic attributes (the "Ideal Debtor") would benefit sig-
nificantly more than other filers.37 As the next sections show, given the
demographic characteristics of different racial groups, the pre-BAPCPA Ideal
Debtor was white.
33. Id. at 1742.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1731; Personal Bankruptcy Consumer Credit Crises: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Administrative Oversight and Courts of the S. Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 105th Cong. 61 (1997) (statement of Dr. Michael E. Staten, Director, Credit
Research Center - Purdue University), available at 1997 WL 176667 (F.D.C.H.);
NAT'L BANKR. REvIEw COMM'N, BANKRUprCY: THE NEXT TwENTY YEARS,
NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY REviEw COMMISSION FINAL REPORT 137 (1997).
36. Race Matters I, supra note 1, at 1742 & n.74.
37. In describing the attributes associated with the Ideal Debtor, I do not mean to
suggest that every white debtor has all those financial or social attributes. Likewise, in
describing the type of debtor who hypothetically would benefit most from bankruptcy
laws, I recognize that there probably are not a significant number of actual debtors
who fit the Ideal Debtor profile. Instead, as I did in Race Matters I, I discuss the at-
tributes associated with the pre-BAPCPA "Ideal Debtor" to show how unconscious
racial biases may have caused legislators and courts to enact or interpret laws in ways
that favor certain demographic groups.
2006]
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A. Marriage
The Code, like most other state and federal laws, favors heterosexual
married debtors. The Code exhibits this bias by, among other things, letting
married debtors file a joint petition and, if allowed by applicable state law,
38exempt their tenants by the entirety property from all but joint creditors.
This marriage bias creates a benefits gap given the significant differences in
marriage rates by race. For example, while Asians are less likely to be di-
vorced, and have comparable marriage rates to whites, they are more likely
than whites to be never married.39 Hispanics are also more likely than whites
to be never married or separated. 40 Blacks are the most likely to be single:
they are more likely to be never married, and to be separated, widowed, or
divorced than the total population.41 This trend is especially prevalent among
black women.
Black women are almost three times as likely to live in households with
no husband present 42 and are more likely overall to be never married than
white or Hispanic women.43 Given the racial marriage gap, the number of
black women who are never married, their larger proportions of nonmarital
births, their higher minority fertility rates, and the increased incidence of di-
vorce generally, almost half of all black households currently are headed by
females." In addition, though the number of black families has increased
38. Race Matters I, supra note 1, at 1736, 1741-42. See also In re Stone, Case
No. 04-75013 (Bankr. W.D. Va. Oct. 7, 2005) (refusing to grant deceased Chapter 13
debtor a hardship discharge, in part, because he had a surviving "lady friend," not a
surviving dependent widow).
39. See TERRANCE REEVES & CLAUDETE BENNETT, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
CENSUS BUREAU, THE ASIAN AND PACIFIC ISLANDER POPULATION IN THE UNITED
STATES: MARCH 2002 at 3 tbl. 1, (Current Population Reports P20-540, May 2003),
available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs /p20-540.pdf.
40. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CENSUS BUREAU, MARITAL STATUS OF THE
POPULATION 15 YEARS OR OLDER BY SEX, HISPANIC ORIGIN, AND RACE: 2004, at
tbl.2.1 (Current Population Survey, 2004), available at
http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/hispanic/ASEC2004/2004CPStab2. l.ht
ml.
41. See JESSE D. MCKINNON & CLAUDETTE E. BENNETT, U.S. DEP'T OF COM-
MERCE, CENSUS BUREAU, WE THE PEOPLE: BLACKS IN THE UNITED STATES 5 (Census
2000 Special Reports, CENSR-25, Aug. 2005), available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2005pubs/censr-25.pdf.
42. Id. at 6.
43. JASON FIELDS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICA'S
FAMILES AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS: 2003, at 9 tbl.4 (Current Population Reports,
P20-553, Nov. 2004), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2004pubs/p20-
553.pdf.
44. Id. at 8 tbl.3. Whereas white single-mother households are more likely to be
the result of a divorce than an out-of-wedlock birth, black single-mother households
are less likely to be the result of a divorce. Id. at 9.
[Vol. 71
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over the last thirty years, there are considerably more white married-couple
families and married couple households4 5 than black married-couple families
or households.46 Indeed, while more minority households exist now than in
1970, the racial marriage gap between whites and blacks has actually wid-
ened.47
B. Employment and Income
To receive the most pre-BAPCPA benefits, the Ideal Debtor needed to
have some disposable income and a fairly steady income stream. Debtors
needed a consistent income stream to be sure they had the necessary compo-
nents to a successful bankruptcy application: access to a lawyer who would
give them pre-filing exemption planning advice, funds to pay the bankruptcy
filing fee, and money to pay the bankruptcy lawyer's fees to prepare the peti-
tion and schedules. 48 Moreover, if the debtor wanted to keep non-exempt
assets or assets he could not fully exempt, he needed income sufficient and
stable enough to fund a (presumptively) three-year Chapter 13 repayment
plan.49
Due in large part to the educational attainment gaps between whites and
blacks and Hispanics,50 blacks have always had higher unemployment rates
45. Id. at 2-3 tbl. 1.
46. See MCKINNON & BENNETr, supra note 41, at 6 fig.4 (finding that 52.5% of
all households were married couples, but only 32.1% of black households were mar-
ried couples). The number of Hispanic households that are married couples, in con-
trast, is larger than the percentage of all households. See ROBERTO R. RAMIREZ, U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CENSUS BUREAU, WE THE PEOPLE: HISPANICS IN THE UNIrED
STATES 7 fig.5 (Census 2000 Special Reports, CENSR-18, Dec. 2004), available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2004pubs/censr- 18.pdf (finding that 55.1% of Hispanic
households were married couples).
47. Race Matters I, supra note 1, at 1747-48. Ironically, this gap may start to
close, not because minorities are marrying more, but because the number of white
married households is also declining. See Joy Jones, Marriage is for White People,
WASH. POST, Mar. 26, 2006, at BO 1.
48. See Race Matters I, supra note 1, at 1743.
49. Id. at 1743-44.
50. PETER FRONCZEK, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME,
EARNINGS, AND POVERTY FROM THE 2004 AMERICAN COMMUNITY 11 (Am. Cinty.
Survey Reports, ACS-01, Aug. 2005), available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2005pubs/acs-0l.pdf (noting that a "person's level of
education is considered to be a predictor of their earnings"); FIELDS, supra note 43, at
9 tbl.4. See also Peter Schmidt, Study Blames Obstacles, Not Lack of Interest, for
Shortage of Black and Hispanic Scientists, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Apr. 4, 2006, at
39; Latest Data Confirm a College Affordability Gap for Students from Middle- and
Lower-Income Families, S. REGIONAL EDUC. BOARD FACT BOOK BULL., June 2006, at
1, available at http://www.sreb.org/main/EdData/Bulletin/60EO8-JuneO6.pdf.
2006]
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than whites and Hispanics.51 As well, Hispanics have a higher unemployment
rate than whites. 52 Not surprisingly, this racial employment gap creates a ra-
cial income gap. Asian households, especially native-born households, have
higher median incomes than white households53 and, indeed, Asian men had
the highest median earnings in 2004 of all groups. 54 For other racial groups,
though, incomes for whites are substantially higher55 and the gap for blacks
and whites has actually increased since the late 1960s.
56
While both black and Hispanic incomes lag behind white median house-
hold incomes, 57 the Hispanic-white gap is striking. White male median earn-
ings ($45,473) in 2004 exceeded Hispanic male median earnings ($26,749)
by more than 70%.58 The black-white income gap is not as stark and, in fact,
it closes in some instances. For example, the gap narrows when married-
couple households are considered and the gap between female workers is less
than the gap between male workers. 59 Moreover, due to the increase in the
number of black millionaires, there has been somewhat of a narrowing of the
gap at the upper income levels.60 Despite this progress, the black-white in-
come gap stubbornly persists at all income levels.
61
51. PATRICK J. KELLY, As AMERICA BECOMES MORE DIVERSE: THE IMPACT OF
STATE HIGHER EDUCATION INEQUALITY 1-2, 15, 17 (Nat'l Ctr. for Higher Educ.
Mgmt. Servs., Nov. 2005) available at
http://www.higheredinfo.org/raceethnicity/nequalityPaperNov2005.pdf. See also
MCKINNON & BENNETT, supra note 41, at 11 (noting that "[t]he percentage of [bilack
men in the labor force was about 10 percentage points lower than for all men").
52. Race Matters I, supra note 1, at 1753.
53. Id. at 1755 ("Some attribute ... this racial group's relatively higher educa-
tional attainment rates and work hours, especially for the female household mem-
bers.").
54. FRONCZEK, supra note 50, at 9.
55. Indeed, whites earn more than other racial groups at each educational level,
and the racial gap between whites and the members of other racial groups widens as
the education level rises from high school to college. See KELLY, supra note 51, at 19.
56. Race Matters I, supra note 1, at 1754.
57. FRONCZEK, supra note 50, at 10 tbl.5. "Black household income is likely
lower than other racial groups' income because blacks have lower marriage rates and
higher percentages of female-headed households, both of which decrease household
income." Race Matters I, supra note 1, at 1755.
58. FRONCZEK, supra note 50, at 10 tbl.5.
59. MCKINNON & BENNETT, supra note 41, at 13-14; U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2002, at 435 No.
655 (2002) available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/02statab/income.pdf
(showing that the gap narrows for married couples and that the gap for female work-
ers is narrower than that for male workers).
60. Id. at 433 No. 652 (showing an increase in the number of black millionaires).
61. Race Matters I, supra note 1, at 1755-56.
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Although good in the abstract, having a high income does not provide
the same overall benefits as having significant wealth. Generally speaking,
individuals who have wealth (stocks, bonds, home equity, business owner-
ship, etc.) are better off than those with income.62 This is because wealth can
always be liquidated and serve as an income replacement if a person loses his
job or incurs unexpected expenses.63 In addition, wealth can help individuals
or their family members acquire more wealth, start a business, or pay for col-
lege.64 Because wealth is distributed among U.S. households far more un-
evenly than income, the racial wealth gap is even more profound and persis-
tent than the income gap.
65
At all income levels, white households have significantly more real and
personal property than black or Hispanic households. For example, the me-
dian household net worth for whites in 2000 was $79,400, and was $55,000
for all groups. In stark contrast, the median net worth of black households
was $7,500 and was $9,750 for Hispanic households. 66 For families in the
lowest earning quintile, the gap is especially pronounced. While overall me-
dian net worth for the lowest earning quintile, including home equity, was
$7,396, white families in this group had a median net worth of $24,000, com-
pared to $57 for black families and $500 for Hispanic families. 67
There is also a racial gap in all types of property ownership. Because
black and Hispanic median household income remains lower than median
white household income, blacks and Hispanics not surprisingly have substan-
tially fewer personal assets (including stocks, interest-bearing bank accounts,
dividends, royalties, etc.) than whites. 68 Likewise, because self-employmentcorrelates positively with wealth, it is not surprising that blacks own busi-




66. SHAWNA ORZECHOWSKI & PETER SEPIELLI, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CEN-
SUS BUREAU, NET WORTH AND ASSET OwNERSHIP OF HOUsEHOLDs: 1998 AND 2000,
at 2, 6, 12 (Current Population Reports, P70-88, May 2003), available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/p70-88.pdf. See also NAT'L URBAN LEAGUE,
THE STATE OF BLACK AMERICA 2005, at 5 (Apr. 6, 2006), available at
http://www.nul.org/publications/SOBA/2005SOBAEXCSUMMARY.pdf (reporting
that median net worth for blacks is ten times less than white net worth).
67. Race Matters I, supra note 1, at 1757.
68. Id. at 1764; JARED BERNSTEIN ET AL., PULLING APART: A STATE-BY-STATE
ANALYSIS OF INCOME TRENDs 43 (Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, Economic
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nesses at rates disproportionately lower than whites and are more likely to be
wage earners, as opposed to business owners.
69
2. Exemptible Assets
Even though bankruptcy laws were designed to provide relief to the
poor but honest debtor, the Ideal Debtor pre-BAPCPA would own mostly
exemptible property or would convert nonexempt property to exempt prop-
erty before filing for bankruptcy. 70 Debtors with exemptible assets (like
homes) could leave both Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 and keep those assets.7'
Moreover, lower-income but higher wealth debtors would be required to de-
vote only part of their relatively low disposable income to repay pre-petition
debts in Chapter 13.72 In contrast, higher-income but no-exemptible-asset debt-
ors would leave Chapter 7 assetless and - even under pre-BAPCPA law -
could be denied a discharge. 73 A number of pre-BAPCPA courts concluded
that a debtor who could afford to repay his debts would not be allowed to
proceed in Chapter 7 because doing so would be "abusive" and that, instead,
he should be forced to at least attempt to repay his debts in Chapter 13. 7
Likewise, a higher-income but no-exemptible-asset debtor would leave Chap-
ter 13 having to use her post-petition earnings to pay more of her debts than
her higher wealth but lower income counterpart.75
The Ideal Debtor pre-BAPCPA would own an expensive home and
preferably live in a state that let him exempt most, if not all, of the value of
69. Race Matters I, supra note 1, at 1767. Though minorities lag behind whites
in business ownership, minority business ownership rates are increasing faster than
the national average. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CENSUS BUREAU, 2002 SURVEY
OF BusINEss OWNERS PRELIMINARY ESTnMATES OF BUSINESS OWNERSHIP BY GENDER,
HISPANIC OR LATINO ORIGIN, AND RACE: 2002 (July 27, 2005), available at
http://www.census.gov/csd/sbo/sector/secOO.HTM; U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
CENSUS BUREAU, 1997 ECONOMIC CENSUS MINORITY- AND WOMEN- OWNED
BUSINESSES UNITED STATES (July 12, 2001), available at
http://www.census.gov/epcd/mwb97/us/us.html. Specifically, while the number of
businesses in the United States increased by 10% between 1997 and 2002, the in-
crease for minority owned businesses was much higher. Id. The increase for native
Hawaiian- and other Pacific Islander-owned businesses increased by 67%; the rate for
black-owned businesses increased by 30%; the rate of increase for Asian-owned busi-
nesses was 13%. Id.
70. Race Matters I, supra note 1, at 1743.




75. Id. While some judicial districts always have had a high percentage of Chap-
ter 13 plans that repay creditors in full, most pre-BAPCPA Chapter 13 debtors with
modest incomes repaid only a limited amount of their debts, especially if they had
relatively high, reasonably necessary living expenses. Id.
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that home. For most people, the bulk of their wealth is held in their homes
and more than 68% of total households owned their homes in 2002. 77 There
is, again, a significant racial disparity in homeownership. Overall, homeown-
ership rates decreased slightly between 2004 and 2005 (from 69% to 68.9%).
However, homeownership rates for whites in 2005 (75%) far exceeded the
rates for blacks (less than 49%), Hispanics (less than 50%), Native Americans
78(58%), and Asians (60%). While these groups are less likely than whites to
be homeowners, blacks and Hispanics are more likely to have more mortgage
debt, which is largely unaffected by bankruptcy laws.79
The pre-BAPCPA Ideal Debtor also would either be the beneficiary of a
spendthrift trust or have an interest in a large ERISA-qualified retirement
fund, both of which would be excluded from their bankruptcy estates. Spend-
thrift trusts are generally not used by the types of people who most often file
for bankruptcy and, instead, typically are planning devices used by the rich.
In contrast, it is not unusual for debtors to have pensions or retirement funds
when they file for bankruptcy. Who is most likely to have retirement savings,
again, varies because there is a racial gap in pension ownership. Workers who
lack pension income are largely young, lower income, nonwhite, female, and
single. In addition, although slightly more than half of all families have
some type of retirement account, the percentage of household net worth that
76. The Ideal Debtor might also liquidate non-exempt assets to purchase an ex-
pensive home. However, the Ideal Debtor needed to avoid having a significant
amount of equity in the home. A pre-BAPCPA Chapter 13 debtor with significant
home equity would run the risk of having a court refuse to confirm his Chapter 13
repayment plan unless he agreed to sell his home and use the proceeds to both secure
less expensive housing and repay some debts. Race Matters I, supra note 1, at 1746.
77. Id. at 1758.
78. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HoUsING VACANCIES AND HOMEOWNERSIP (2005),
available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housinghvs/annual05/annO5t2O.htnl.
See also NAT'L URBAN LEAGUE, supra note 66, at 5 (characterizing the black home-
ownership rate as stagnant and noting higher denial rates for mortgages and home
improvement loans).
79. Race Matters I, supra note 1, at 1758-59. Mortgage obligations, though tech-
nically dischargeable, effectively survive bankruptcy cases. Id. at 1735. While a
Chapter 7 debtor's personal obligation to repay home mortgage debt can be dis-
charged, the mortgage holder's lien on the debtor's home survives the bankruptcy. Id.
Thus, even if the loan is a nonrecourse loan or the debtor receives a discharge and is
not personally obligated to repay the mortgage, the creditor can foreclose on the
debtor's home even after the debtor receives a discharge in Chapter 7. Id. Chapter 13
homeowners face similar limitations, since their Chapter 13 plans cannot be con-
firmed unless they, in essence, agree to pay their mortgage debt in full. 11 U.S.C. §§
1322(b)(2), 1325(a)(5) (Supp. V 2005).
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is held in retirement accounts, the total amount invested, and the participation
rate in retirement plans varies dramatically by race. 81
Since blacks and Hispanics tend to be younger, have less income, and
are more likely to be never-married than whites, it is not surprising that the
pension participation rate for whites is higher than it is for blacks, is signifi-
cantly higher than it is for Hispanics, and is somewhat higher than the rate for
Asian Americans. 83 The pension disparities also may exist because blacks and
Hispanics have relatively higher unemployment and underemployment rates,
and whites are more likely to be employed by the types of employers who
provide pension plans.84 In addition, because whites have higher incomes and
greater wealth, it is not surprising that minorities have smaller pensions be-
cause participation rates, as well as amounts and values of tax-deferred re-
tirement accounts, increase with income and wealth.85 Finally, because recent
immigrants often send funds to relatives in their home countries, this also
may explain why certain minority groups may choose to have higher current




For several reasons, the Ideal Debtor pre-BAPCPA needed relatively
high living expenses for herself and her dependents. Courts reached conflict-
81. Race Matters I, supra note 1, at 1765.
82. MCKINNON & BENNETr, supra note 41, at 4 (noting that black median age is
5 years younger than the national median age); U.S. CENsus BUREAU, POPULATION BY
SEX, AGE, HISPANIC ORIGIN, AND RACE: 2004, at tbl.1.1, available at
http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/hispanic/ASEC2004/2004CPStab 1. 1 a.p
df (indicating that 34.3% of Hispanics in 2004 are less than 18 years old, and only
5.1% are over age 65, while 25.5% of whites are under age 18 and 12% of whites are
over age 65).
83. Race Matters I, supra note 1, at 1765-66; Craig Copeland, Employment-
Based Retirement Plan Participation: Geographic Differences and Trends, 2004,
2005 EMP. BENEFrr RES. INST. 8 fig.2, available at
http://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/EBRI-IB_10-20051 .pdf.
84. Blacks and Hispanics often work for smaller employers who do not sponsor
retirement plans; similarly, many work part-time and are excluded from coverage by
their employers because of their part-time status. Race Matters I, supra note 1, at
1766; Copeland, supra note 83, at 7-8.
85. Ana M. Aizcorbe et al., Recent Changes in U.S. Family Finances: Evidence
from the 1998 and 2001 Survey of Consumer Finances, 89 FED. RES. BULL. 1, 11
(2003), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2003/0103lead.pdf;
Copeland, supra note 83, at 13 fig.5, 14 fig.8.
86. See generally Richard Lempert & Karl Monsma, Cultural Differences and
Discrimination: Samoans Before a Public Housing Eviction Board, 59 AM. SOC. REV.
890, 895 (1984) (noting that Samoan families that help family members emigrate to
the United States expect cash payments in return).
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ing results both as to the types of expenses that are reasonable and the people
debtors could claim as dependents. For example, when considering a motion
to dismiss a Chapter 7 petition for substantial abuse, courts often scrutinized
expenses like voluntary contributions to retirement plans or private school
tuition payments for children when deciding whether a Chapter 7 debtor's
petition was abusive because she had the ability to repay some of her debts in
Chapter 13. 87 Similarly, courts evaluated Chapter 13 debtors' proposed ex-
penditures, including expenses for dependents or household members, when
deciding whether their plans devoted all disposable income to debt repay-
ment. 88 In addition, when deciding whether debtors could discharge a student
loan, courts were required to consider whether repaying the debt would im-
pose an "undue hardship" on them and their dependents. 89 Finally, bank-
ruptcy and some state exemption laws permit debtors to exempt certain
monetary payments they are entitled to receive if those payments are rea-
sonably necessary for the support of the debtor or his dependents.
90
Though courts were often required to make decisions about debtors and
their dependents in both Chapter 7 and 13 cases, the pre-BAPCPA Code gave
only one partial definition for the term "dependent." When deciding whether
debtors could exempt payments that were necessary for the support of the
debtor of his dependents, the Code provided that the term "dependent" in-
cluded a spouse - even one who is not actually dependent on the debtor.
91
Unfortunately, the pre-BAPCPA Code did not define "dependent" for any
other purpose in the Code, and courts did not precisely or consistently explain
which family member would be deemed a debtor's dependent. For example,
some courts concluded that anyone who reasonably relied on the Chapter 13
debtor for support and for whom the debtor had reason to and did support
financially, including adult children, parents, or grandchildren, was a depend-
ent whose expenses could be deducted before reaching disposable income.
Other courts adopted a more restrictive view and would not allow debtors to
exclude expenses for nonlegal dependents - even if the individuals were
actually dependent on the debtor for support - because doing so effectively
would force creditors to subsidize the debtor's lifestyle choice to support
parents, adult children, grandchildren, or domestic partners and their chil-
dren.92 Similarly, when deciding whether it would be an undue hardship to
require a debtor to repay a student loan, some courts used a flexible definition
87. In re MacDonald, 222 B.R. 69, 77 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1998).
88. Race Matters I, supra note 1, at 1728-29.
89. See, e.g., Bray v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp., (In re Bray), 332 B.R. 186
(Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2005); Doe v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp (In re Doe), 325 B.R. 69
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005).
90. Race Matters I, supra note 1, at 1738.
91. 11 U.S.C. § 522(a)(1) (2000).
92. Bossardet v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Bossardet), 336 B.R. 451, 454,
459 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2005) (disregarding expenses of adult children, including an
incarcerated adult son, and elderly parents); Bray, 332 B.R. at 194, 195.
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that included nonlegal dependents. In contrast, other courts refused to con-
sider the expenses of nonlegal dependents, even if they actually depended on
the debtor for financial support.
93
How "dependent" is defined matters largely because household compo-
sition and the economic relationships between households of family members
vary by race. While Hispanics have the largest family households, black and
Asian households also are larger than the average size of white households.
94
Blacks and Hispanics are more likely to be in intergenerational households
(parent, child, grandchild) and black and Hispanic adults are more likely than
whites to provide financial support to their parents, other non-nuclear rela-
tives, and fictive kin.95 For a number of reasons, blacks and Hispanics are
more likely than other racial groups to rear or informally adopt children who
are in their extended family or who are not related to them biologically.
96
Similarly, while black children are more likely than children of other races
not to live with either of their parents, and, of all children who do not live
with their parents, blacks are the least likely to live with people other than
relatives.
97
Grandparent-headed households have increased dramatically. While
numerically most of the grandparents who live with grandchildren are white,
only 2% of white grandparents live with their grandchildren while between 6-
10% of minority grandparents live with their grandchildren. Within the mi-
nority groups, Hispanic grandparents are the most likely to be primary care-
93. See Doe, 325 B.R. at 74-75 (presenting judicial views of "dependent"). See
also Schilling v. Montalvo (In re Montalvo), 333 B.R. 145 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 2005)
(discussing living arrangement of debtor, his wife/fiancee, and the seven children,
including the fiancee's daughter's boyfriend and a foster child, who lived with them).
94. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AVGl. AVERAGE NUMBER OF PEOPLE PER
HOUSEHOLD, BY RACE AND HISPANIC ORIGIN, MARrrAL STATUS, AGE, AND
EDUCATION OF HOUSEHOLDER: 2004 (2004), available at
http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/hh-fam/cps2004/tabAVGI .csv; U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, AVG2. AVERAGE NUMBER OF PEOPLE PER FAMILY
HOUSEHOLD, BY RACE AND HISPANIC ORIGIN, MARITAL STATUS,
AGE, AND EDUCATION OF HOUSEHOLDER: 2004 (2004), available at
http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/hh-fam/cps2004/tabAVG2.csv;
MCKINNON & CLAUDETrE, supra note 41, at 6.
95. See Mireya Navarro, Many Families Add Third Generation to Their House-
holds, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2006, at A24 (noting that multigenerational living is
common in Asian and Hispanic countries). It is not unusual for the extended black
family to expand beyond blood relatives and include "fictive kin," which are people
who are not related though they may provide more support services than blood kin.
Connie M. Kane, African American Family Dynamics as Perceived by Family Mem-
bers, 30 J. BLACK STUDIES 691, 693 (2000). See also Lempert & Monsma, supra note
86, at 901-04 (noting that in Samoan culture, sending money to relatives "may seem
every bit as compelling as the need" to pay your debts).
96. Race Matters I, supra note 1, at 1746-52.
97. Id. at 1750.
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givers for their grandchildren while Asian grandparents are the least likely to
be the primary caregivers for those grandchildren. 98 Given the increase in
single-parent households and the economic hardships single-parent house-
holds face, it is not surprising that more than half of all grandparents appear
to spend money on their grandchildren's educational needs, and a significant
majority help pay their living or medical expenses. While it is unclear
whether minority grandparents provide proportionately more financial sup-
port than other grandparents, this seems likely since Hispanic and black
grandparents are more likely than white grandparents to be the primary care-
givers of their grandchildren or to have a grandchild live in their home.
99
E. Debts
The Ideal Debtor pre-BAPCPA needed to have few, if any, nondis-
chargeable debts, including student loans, alimony or child support obliga-
tions, and nondischargeable credit card debt. With respect to student loans,
the income and wealth racial gaps discussed above indicate that the typical
black and Hispanic college student is more likely to be from a lower income
household and likely will receive smaller parental contributions for their edu-
cational expenses.1° In addition, white and Asian college students are more
likely to persist to receive their college degree than blacks, Hispanics and
Native Americans. 10 1 This ultimately creates an earnings gap, as workers with
a college degree earn almost twice as much as those who have only a high
98. TAVIA SIMMONS & JANE LAWLER DYE, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
CENSUS BUREAU, GRANDPARENTS LIVING WITH GRANDCHILDREN: 2000,
at 2 (Census 2000 Brief, C2KBR-31, Oct. 2003), available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/c2kbr-3 1.pdf.
Another study indicates that a significantly higher percentage (13%) of black
children live with their grandparents, relative to Hispanic children (8%), or
white or Asian children (4%). Amy Goyer, Intergenerational Relationships:
Grandparents Raising Grandchildren, (Nov. 2005), available at
http://www.aarp.org/research/faniily/grandparenting/nov_ 05_grandparents.html. The
black grandparent number, while relatively high, is small relative to the estimated
60% of Native American children who are purported to be raised by their grandpar-
ents. Id.
99. TERRY LUGAILA & JULIA OVERTURF, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, CILDREN AND THE HOUSEHOLDS THEY LIVE IN: 2000, at 2, 7 (CENSUS 2000
SPECIAL REPORTS, CENSR-14, Mar. 2004), available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2004pubs/censr- 14.pdf.
100. Race Matters I, supra note 1, at 1770. See also Latest Data Confirm, supra
note 50 (discussing college affordability gap for students from middle- and lower-
income families). See generally Schmidt, supra note 50.
101. KELLY, supra note 51, at 18; see REEVES & BENNETT, supra note 39. See
generally J. Fredericks Volkwein et al., Factors Associated with Student Loan Default
Among Different Racial and Ethnic Groups, 69 J. HIGHER EDUC. 206 (1998).
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school diploma. 0 2 Because whites tend to have higher earnings than minori-
ties with the same educational level, even those minorities who have attended
college will likely have less income available to repay their student loans than
will white college attendees 103 Finally, since low-income students and stu-
dents whose parents did not attend college are statistically more likely to de-
fault on student loans than other students, blacks and Hispanics appear to
have higher student loan default rates.l14
As for family support obligations, many single-parent households are
entitled to financial assistance from the noncustodial parent, though not all
custodial parents who are awarded financial support actually receive it. There
is a clear racial disparity among those people who are ordered to pay child
support and those who receive child support payments. Relative to their total
population in the United States,1°5 blacks are more likely than whites to have
an obligation to provide child support. Thus, out of the total population that
provided support in 2002, 67% were white, 16.4% were black, and 14.4%
were Hispanic. °6 Out of the total population that received child support in
2002, 67% were white, 19% were black, and 12% were Hispanic. 7 That
blacks are more likely to be ordered to pay child support and that whites are
less likely to receive support is not surprising given the relatively lower mar-
riage rates, the higher fertility rates, and the larger proportions of non-marital
births among blacks.1
0 8
Most credit card debts were dischargeable pre-BAPCPA. However,
credit card debts that were incurred as a result of fraud, or that were for lux-
ury goods or service that exceeded $1,225 in the aggregate and were incurred
102. See Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, College Degree Nearly Doubles
Annual Earnings, Census Bureau Reports (Mar. 28, 2005), available at
http://www.census.govlPress-Release/www/releases/archives/educationlO04214.html.
103. KELLY, supra note 51, at 19 (noting that minorities earn substantially less
than whites at almost all educational levels).
104. J. Fredericks Volkwein & Alberto F. Cabrera., Who Defaults on Student
Loans? The Effects of Race, Class, and Gender on Borrower Behavior, in
CONDEMNING STUDENTS TO DEBT: COLLEGE LOANS AND PUBLIC POLICY (Richard
Fossey & Mark Bateman eds. 1998); Volkwein et al., supra note 101. See also Race
Matters I, supra note 1, at 1770 n.218.
105. In 2004, 75.6% of all Americans were white, 12.2% were black, and 14.2%
were Hispanic. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2004 American Community Survey; Data Pro-
file Highlights; Fact Sheet, available at http://factfmder.census.gov.
106. TIMOTHY S. GRALL, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, CENSUS
BUREAU, SUPPORT PROVIDERS: 2002, at 2 (Current Population Reports, P70-99, Feb.
2005), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2005pubs/p70-99.pdf.
107. Id.
108. JANE LAWLER DYE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, CENSUS
BUREAU, FERTILITY OF AMERICAN WOMEN: JUNE 2004, at 3-5 (Current Population




Missouri Law Review, Vol. 71, Iss. 4 [2006], Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol71/iss4/5
RACE MATTERS
within 60 days of the filing, were nondischargeable. 1°9 In addition, if a debtor
used a credit card to get a cash advance that exceeded $1,215 within 60 days
of the filing, the debt was presumed fraudulent and nondischargeable if the
purchases were for luxury goods." 0 Because blacks and Hispanics have lower
incomes and significantly fewer assets than whites, they appear to rely more
heavily on credit card debt than whites. In addition, blacks, Hispanics, and
Asians all appear to pay more than the national average toward their monthly
credit card bills. Finally, blacks, Hispanics and Asians have higher credit card
debt than the national average."'
F. Conclusion
There is, of course, no reason to believe that Congress intentionally dis-
criminated against minorities when they enacted bankruptcy laws that favored
whites, or that courts interpreted the pre-BAPCPA Code in a way that favored
whites. Nonetheless, the demographic characteristics of the minority popula-
tion made it more likely that whites would be the Ideal Debtor. The pre-
BABCPA Code gave benefits based on marital status, which had a dispropor-
tionately negative effect on minorities due to their lower marriage rates.
Likewise, the Ideal Debtor pre-BAPCPA needed to have stable employment,
some disposable income, and have wealth that was concentrated in retirement
plans or other property, like exempt assets, that could be shielded from credi-
tors' collection attempts. Again, these factors likely favored potential white
debtors. Finally, the Ideal Debtor Pre-BAPCPA needed to have only legal
dependents and have few nondischargeable debts; attributes that more likely
are found in white debtors. Since a hypothetical white debtor would receive
more bankruptcy benefits than those received by a hypothetical minority
debtor, race mattered under the pre-BAPCPA Code.
The next Part of this Article will consider whether the Ideal Debtor also
benefits under BAPCPA and, more importantly, whether race continues to
matter in bankruptcy.
109. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(C) (2000), amended by 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(C)
(Supp. V 2005).
110. Id.
111. Javier Silva & Rebecca Epstein, Costly Credit: African-Americans and Lati-
nos in Debt, May 2005, available at
http://www.demos.org/pubs/Costly%20Credit%20final.pdf; Race Matters I, supra
note 1, at 1775.
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IV. THE BANKRUPTCY ABUSE PREVENTION AND CONSUMER
PROTECTION ACT
A. Policy Justifications for BAPCPA
Historically, bankruptcy laws have not considered why a debtor needed
debt relief, nor have prior laws conditioned relief on whether the debtor was
over-indebted for good or bad reasons."2 And while BAPCPA itself does not
explicitly make distinctions based on why the debtor filed, its supporters con-
tended that the pre-BAPCPA Code made it too easy for "deadbeats" to get
out of paying bills they could afford to pay and that bankruptcy laws needed
to be reformed to restore "personal responsibility and integrity in the bank-ruptc systm.'' 13
ruptcy system." To prevent people from using bankruptcy "as a tool for
fraud to cheat their way out of debt,' 14 BAPCPA supporters insisted on
eliminating, or at least severely curbing, a debtor's statutory right to decide
whether to discharge debts in Chapter 7 rather than repay them in Chapter
13.115 While Section 707(b) of the pre-BAPCPA Code gave judges the au-
thority to dismiss abusive filings, Congress and other critics of the pre-
BAPCPA Code concluded that judges did not adequately detect fraud and
abuse and that they allowed too many debtors with "means" to avoid repaying
their debts under Chapter 7.116
BAPCPA's proponents maintained that the pre-BAPCPA Code gave
high-income debtors a perverse incentive to engage in dishonest, opportunis-
tic, financially irresponsible behavior 1 17 and that discharging debts had just
112. ROBIN JEWELER, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, BANKRUPTCY RELIEF AND
NATURAL DISASTER VICTIMS, at 2 (Sept. 14, 2005), available at
http://www.opencrs.com/rpts/RL33082_20050914.pdf#search='bankruptcy%20relief
%20and%20natural%20disaster%20victims'.
113. H.R. REP. No. 109-31, pt. 1, at 2 (2005), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N.
88, 89.
114. See 151 CONG. REc. E737 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2005) (statement of Rep.
Tiahrt).
115. H.R. REP. No. 109-31, pt. 1, at 12 (2005), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N.
88, 89 ("[T]he rate of repayment to creditors would increase as more debtors were
shifted into chapter 13.").
116. H.R. REP. No. 109-31, pt. 1, at 5 (2005), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N.
88, 92. Indeed, one critic went so far as to say that bankruptcy judges, who he
branded as not "real judges," were part of the problem because they failed to exercise
discretion in the ways that favored creditors. See Peter G. Gosselin, Judges Say Over-
haul Would Weaken Bankruptcy System, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2005, at Al.
117. See H.R. REP. No. 109-31, pt. 1, at 5 (2005), as reprinted in 2005
U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 92. ("[T]he present bankruptcy system has loopholes and incentives
that allow and-sometimes-even encourage opportunistic personal filings and abuse.");
144 CONG. REC. H10224, H10234 (1998) (statement of Rep. Goodlatte) ("Under the
current system, some irresponsible people filing for bankruptcy run up their credit
[Vol. 71
20
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 71, Iss. 4 [2006], Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol71/iss4/5
RACE MATTERS
become an easy process that no longer carried any stigma.' To curb the
opportunistic Abusive Debtor, BAPCPA imposes a number of eligibility and
reporting requirements that are designed to make it harder to file for all debt-
ors to receive a discharge of their debts. While the characteristics associated
with the Ideal Debtor pre-BAPCPA are not co-extensive with the characteris-
tics associated with the Abusive Debtor, BAPCPA's attempt to harm the lat-
ter also will harm the former. That is, by making it more difficult for anyone
to receive a quick and relatively painless Chapter 7 discharge, BAPCPA cur-
tails many of the benefits previously available to the pre-BAPCPA Ideal
(white) Debtor.
B. Means Test
The centerpiece of BAPCPA is a "means test." In general, the means
test formula considers debtors' "current monthly income" ("CMr') 11 9 and
expenses to determine which debtors have the ability to repay their non-
priority unsecured debts over a five year period. The means test formula pur-
ports to determine which debtors are abusing the privilege of discharging
their debts in Chapter 7 and which are truly deserving of this relief. 120 Chap-
ter 7 debtors whose income is below the applicable median income, which is
determined by comparison to similar households in the state where the debtor
files, are exempt from the means test and presumptively are deemed deserv-
ing of relief.1
21
card debt immediately prior to filing knowing that their debts will soon be wiped
away.").
118. S. REP. No. 105-253, at 23-24 (1998).
119. Ironically, CMI is neither current, monthly, nor income. Rather than use
actual current income, CMI is calculated by considering the total funds (including
income and other non-income funds) the debtor received in the six months before the
bankruptcy filing. By averaging the funds a debtor received over a 6 month period,
the means test could impute fictitious income to a debtor whose income decreased as
a result of losing a job or as a result of a failed business venture. Moreover, this defi-
nition encourages debtors with predictably seasonal income (school teachers, land-
scapers, lifeguards, construction workers, etc.) to file for bankruptcy when their actual
prior income is low relative to their anticipated future income.
120. No one - not even BAPCPA's most ardent advocates - honestly believed
that the means test would generate a presumption of abuse in a significant number of
cases because most people who file for bankruptcy have income below the applicable
medians. See, e.g., Marianne B. Culhane & Michaela M. White, Catching Can-Pay
Debtors: Is the Means Test the Only Way?, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 665 (2005);
Eugene R. Wedoff, Means Testing in the New 707(b), 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 231, 277-
78 (2005) (citing empirical studies finding little abuse pre-BAPCPA).
121. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(7)(A) (Supp. V 2005). The only above-median Chapter 7
debtors who are entirely exempted from the means test are disabled veterans whose
debts arose because they were on active duty or performing a homeland security ac-
tivity during time of war. See id. § 707(b)(2)(D). The Chapter 13 means test applies to
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"Median family income" is calculated by reference to Census Bureau
data. Because the Code must rely on census data (and definitions), it is not
clear how to calculate household size for purposes of the means test. That is,
when deciding whether the means test applies or whether to dismiss a
debtor's Chapter 7 filing, the court must compare the debtor's CMI to the
median "family" income of a person that lives in a "household" the size of the
debtor's. The Census Bureau defines a family as two or more people related
by birth, marriage, or adoption who reside in the same housing unit. "House-
hold" is defined more broadly and includes both family and non-family
households. Households consist of all people who occupy a housing unit re-
gardless of relationship and may include multiple unrelated individuals or
families living together.
123
Debtors with above-median income may proceed in Chapter 7 only if
they "pass" the means test. Debtors pass the test by showing that their CMI,
after subtracting certain expenses outlined in the Internal Revenue Service
collection financial standards and secured and priority debts,124 is less than a
specified benchmark. In calculating the amount of income that debtors theo-
retically would have to pay their debts, the means test requires the debtor to
multiply their deemed monthly income by 60, since the presumption in the
Code now is that Chapter 13 debtors will fund a 5 (not 3) year plan. If the test
shows that the debtor has less than either $100 in monthly disposable income
or $6,000 in disposable income over five years, the presumption of abuse is
rebutted.125 A debtor with monthly disposable income between $100-$166.66
all debtors, not just those with above-median income. There is, at least, the presump-
tion that below median Chapter 13 debtors' plans will be for three (not five) years. Id.
§ 1322(d)(2).
122. Id. §101(39A)(A).
123. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY (CPA) -
DEFINmONS AND EXPLANATIONS (Jan. 20, 2004), available at
http://www.census.gov/populationlwww/cps/cpsdef.html.
124. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I). Using IRS guidelines is somewhat problem-
atic. Because these standards are used to help IRS agents determine a taxpayer's abil-
ity to pay delinquent taxes, the standards are intentionally restrictive and "somewhat
draconian." See The Increase in Personal Bankruptcy and the Crisis in Consumer
Credit: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Oversight and the Courts of the
Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 99 (1997) (testimony of Kenneth R. Crone,
Senior Vice President, Visa U.S.A., Inc.). Moreover, since the standards are internal
guidelines, the IRS can change them - and, thus, the means test - without providing
notice or seeking public comment. Finally, relying on these standards adds even yet
more inconsistencies in consumer bankruptcy cases since some standards, including
those for food, clothing, and, housekeeping supplies, are used in all cases nationally
while other standards, such as housing, utilities, and transportation, are local and, will
thus vary by county within each state. See IRS.gov,
http://www.irs.gov/individuals/article/0,,id=96543,00.html (last visited Sept. 25,
2006).
125. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(i).
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might be denied relief in Chapter 7 unless she has non-priority unsecured debt
that exceeds a certain benchmark.' 26 A Chapter 7 filing for a debtor whose
disposable income exceeds either $166.66 monthly or $10,000 over 5 years is
presumptively abusive regardless of the amount of unsecured debt. 127 The
debtor cannot proceed in Chapter 7 unless she demonstrates "special circum-
stances. ' 28 Proving special circumstances requires the debtor to itemize each
additional expense or adjustment to income and provide documentation and a
detailed explanation for those special circumstances.' 29 A debtor who cannot
rebut the presumption will be deemed a Chapter 7 Abusive Debtor and courts
may dismiss the Chapter 7 petition or, with the debtor's consent, convert the
debtor's case to Chapter 13.13°
Both the justifications for the means test and the formula itself raise a
number of potentially troubling issues. First, empirical data show that more
than 60% of Chapter 13 debtors do not complete plan payments. 131 Despite
this relatively high failure rate, the only relief option for a debtor who fails
the means test is to proceed in Chapter 13 and propose a plan that repays
debts over a period of 60 months, as opposed to the pre-BAPCPA norm of 36.
Perhaps even more problematic, though, is that BAPCPA generally and the
means test specifically are riddled with counterintuitive ambiguities and have




128. For example, debtors who flunk the means test because of fictitious income
that is included in the five year average should be able to rebut the presumption that
this income is available to them by showing that they were permanently laid off from
a job and that there is no reasonable likelihood that they will have a job that pays
them comparable wages in the near future. When the means test is applied in Chapter
13, however, debtors are not allowed to seek adjustments to their income for "special
circumstances."
129. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(B)(i)-(ii).
130. Id. § 707(b)(1).
131. Personal Bankruptcy: A Literature Review, CONG. BUDGET OFF. Papers 31
(Sept. 2000), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/24xx/doc2421/Bankruptcy.pdf.
132. For a particularly witty response to the bill's drafting ambiguities, see In re
Riddle, 344 B.R. 702 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2006), where the court, in attempting to inter-
pret automatic dismissals under 11 U.S.C. § 521, writes (in a tribute to Dr. Seuss's
Green Eggs and Ham):
What does automatic dismissal mean?
And by what means can it be seen?
Are we only left to guess?
Oh please Congress, fix this mess!
Until it's fixed what should I do?
How can I explain this mess to you?
Id. See also In re Rodriguez, 336 B.R. 462, 469 (2005) (discussing credit coun-
seling requirement and noting that, "[1]ike much of BAPCPA, it is hard to tell
whether terminology is used with active intention or sloppy inattention.").
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C. Costs
While the total amount due on filing, including fees and administrative
expenses, more than doubled between BAPCPA's enactment date and the
first anniversary of its enactment, 133 BAPCPA does provide some relief for
truly indigent debtors. For the first time, courts can waive filing fees for debt-
ors whose income is below 150% of the poverty level.134 This is especially
fortunate since, in addition to imposing higher filing fees, the reporting re-
quirements imposed on both debtors and lawyers have caused legal fees to
increase. That is, pre-BAPCPA, debtors or their lawyers were required to file
the bankruptcy petition, schedules that list creditors, assets, income, etc., and
a statement of financial affairs. BAPCPA requires considerably more as debt-
ors must provide that information plus a host of other documents, including
copies of all payment "advices" (i.e., pay stubs), a statement of monthly net
income explaining how the amount was calculated, a means test calculation,
an annual income statement, and tax returns.135 The penalty for non-
compliance is harsh, as BAPCPA provides that the case automatically is dis-
missed 136 or that it may be delayed if the debtor fails to provide required in-
formation. 137 These new reporting requirements, in turn, force debtors' coun-
133. Section 325 of BAPCPA originally increased Chapter 7 filing fees to $200,
but decreased Chapter 13 filing fees from $155 to $150 (ostensibly to encourage more
debtors to file under Chapter 13). Congress amended BAPCPA to increase the Chap-
ter 7 fee by an additional $20 as part of the 2005 Emergency Supplemental Appro-
priations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, Pub. L. No.
109-13, 119 Stat. 231. That the increase was included as a technical amendment in
this bill is somewhat ironic, since it forced all debtors - even those below-median
debtors who presumptively deserve Chapter 7 relief - to pay higher filing fees to
help finance foreign aid and the Iraq war. In addition to the $220 filing fee, other fees
due on filing are $54, making the total fees due $274.
In February 2006, Congress increased Chapter 7 filing fees again (from $220 to
$245) and increased Chapter 13 filing fees from $150 to $235) as part of the Deficit
Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, 120 Stat. 4. Total Chapter 7 fees due on
filing are $299. Stated differently, between the time BAPCPA was signed into law
(April 2005) and the first anniversary of the signing, Congress increased the cost of
filing under both Chapter 7 and 13 by 63%. Moreover, by using bankruptcy filing fees
to help offset the federal deficit, Congress substantially diminished the economic
incentive for debtors to file for relief under Chapter 13 ($235) rather than Chapter 7
($245).
134. 28 U.S.C. § 1930(f)(1) (Supp. V 2005). One unfortunate consequence of the
decision to allow Chapter 7 debtors to avoid paying filing fees is that, because trus-
tees' compensation comes from the filing fee in each case, the Chapter 7 trustees in
those cases will not likely be paid for any work they do on those cases.
135. 11 U.S.C. §§ 521(a), § 1308(a).
136. See Riddle, 344 B.R. 702.
137. 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(6)(B). The automatic dismissal may be delayed for no
more than 45 days if the debtor can show cause. Id. It may be delayed indefinitely if
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sel to conduct more extensive (and expensive) investigations into their cli-
ents' financial affairs to ensure that the debtor complies with these new re-
quirements and also to ensure that the lawyer complies with the new ethical
requirements BAPCPA imposes.
38
BAPCPA also imposed a financial counseling requirement that in-
creased debtors' filing costs. Many members of Congress appeared to believe
that bankruptcy filings had increased because debtors were not financially
literate. 139 To increase debtor financial literacy, BAPCPA makes debtors in-
eligible for bankruptcy relief unless they receive a "briefing" from a credit
counseling agency approved by the Office of the United States Trustee
("OUST") within 180 days before they file for bankruptcy.14 0 All debtors -
even if they are financially literate or they filed for bankruptcy for reasons
other than reckless spending - must satisfy this eligibility requirement.
BAPCPA permits courts to waive this requirement for a limited period, not to
exceed 45 days, if debtors show "exigent circumstances" and show that they
tried to get counseling at least five days before filing their bankruptcy peti-
14'tions but were unable to do so. In addition, Chapter 13 debtors must re-
ceive financial management training from an approved financial education
provider before they can receive a discharge.
42
the trustee requests that the case not be dismissed because the debtor made a good
faith attempt to provide the information, and it would be in the creditors' best interest
for the case to proceed. Id.
138. BAPCPA imposes new sanctions on Chapter 7 debtor's counsel if the
debtor's case is dismissed for abuse. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(4). This undoubtedly will
require lawyers to scrutinize the debtor's purported income more closely by reviewing
the pay stubs to calculate monthly income. Lawyers may need to obtain credit reports
on their clients to verify that the debtors have listed all debts, and may need to review
court records to ensure that there are no relevant judgments, liens, or pending suits
involving their clients.
139. See H.R. REP. No. 109-31, pt. 1, at 18 (2005), as reprinted in 2005
U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 104; 151 CONG. REc. E704-03 (daily ed. Apr. 19, 2005) (statement
of Rep. Moore), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getpage.cgi?dbname=2005_record&page=E704&position=all.
140. This counseling can occur either over the phone or the Internet. 11 U.S.C. §
109(h)(1). The Office of the United States Trustee lists the approved agencies on its
website. See http://www.usdoj.gov/ust/eo/bapcpa/ccde/de-approved.htm (last visited
Oct. 1, 2006). Debtors "pass" online briefings typically by answering a series of ques-
tions that are posed after each section. See, e.g., American Bureau of Credit Services,
Inc., http://americanbureauofcredit.com/pricing.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2006).
141. 11 U.S.C. § 109(h)(3). This requirement can be waived completely only for
debtors who are mentally incapacitated, severely disabled or on active duty in a mili-
tary combat zone. Id. § 109(h)(4).
142. Id. § 1328(g)(1). Chapter 13 debtors in some jurisdictions can efficiently
satisfy the financial management requirement, since most Chapter 13 trustees in
those areas provide this debtor education in cases in which they serve as the
standing trustee. See Barbara P. Foley & Angela Egner, Creating A Debtor Edu-
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BAPCPA requires credit counseling fees to be reasonable and providers
are required to offer the instruction without regard to the debtor's ability to
pay. 43 A number of agencies have surfaced post-BAPCPA to provide pre-
and post-petition debtor education and it appears that the debtors who are
aware of this requirement can quickly satisfy the pre-petition counseling re-
quirement by using one of the providers on the Internet. 144 While this eligibil-
ity requirement is theoretically easy to satisfy, 145 it nonetheless increases all
cation Program, 18-1 NAT'L ASS'N OF CHAPTER 13 TRUSTEES Q. 1, 14-17
(2006); United States Trustees,
http://www.usdoj.gov/ust/eo/bapcpa/ccde/de-approved4-2.htm#VA (last visited
Sept. 27, 2006); U.S. Trustee Program,
http://www.usdoj.gov/ust/eo/bapcpa/ccde/de-approved.htm (last visited Nov. 9,
2006).
143. 11 U.S.C. § 11l(c)(2)(B) (2000). The typical cost for the courses, which
usually must be paid in cash or money order, is approximately $50-$75 for both the
pre-filing and pre-discharge education. See American Bureau of Credit,
http://www.americanbureauofcredit.com/pricing.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2006);
GreenPath Debt Solutions, http://www.greenpathbk.com/faq-consumer.htm (last
visited Sept. 27, 2006); California Credit Counseling Services,
http://www.califomiacccs.org/bkcounseling (last visited Sept. 28, 2006).
Though guidelines issued by the Office of the United States Trustee state that
approved credit counseling agencies cannot withhold services because of an inability
to pay, neither BAPCPA or OUST has explained what fee would be unreasonable and
what criteria should be used to determine whether a debtor is unable to pay the fees.
See U.S. Department of Justice,
http://www.usdoj.gov/ustl/eo/bapcpa/ccde/docs/DE ApplicationInstructions.pdf (last
visited Sept. 27, 2006). Some providers waive the fee if the debtor would satisfy the
requirements to have a waiver of the filing fees. See Money Management Interna-
tional, http://www.moneymanagement.org/OurProgram/bankruptcy-
counseling.asp?CMP=OTC-PBCPRAD (last visited Sept. 27, 2006) (waiver where
debtor's household income is less than 150% of poverty level); BK Help,
www.bkhelp.org/att.fees.php (last visited Sept. 27, 2006) (waiver based on household
income and inability to pay based on budget analysis).
144. Many of the internet providers contain overtly hostile information concern-
ing bankruptcy, even under the link that takes users to bankruptcy counseling. For
example, the Consumer Credit Counseling Service of Montana, Inc. states that
"[b]ankruptcy is the last resort for consumers in dire financial need, and for good
reason" and disparagingly observing that, while "widely advertised as a 'quick fix' to
your financial issues, bankruptcy is not always the answer to your problems." See
Consumer Credit Counseling Service of Montana,
http://www.cccsmt.org/modules/contentlindex.php?id=4 (last visited Sept. 28, 2006)
(first emphasis added).
145. But see In re Sosa, 336 B.R. 113, 114 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2005) (characteriz-
ing the requirement as an "inane" and "absurd" one that applies to all debtors "no
matter how dire the circumstances the person finds themselves in at that moment").
Whether it is "easy" also would depend on whether the potential debtor has access to
high-speed Internet access and has a debit card that can be used to pay for the coun-
seling (most providers, not surprisingly, do not accept credit cards).
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debtors' costs, even undisputedly poor and honest debtors who should be
entitled to a quick Chapter 7 discharge. Moreover, early reports question the
efficacy of requiring debtors to spend both time and money participating in
pre-filing counseling, since those studies suggest that few people who have
participated in credit counseling had any realistic financial option other than
filing for bankruptcy. 146 Finally, this requirement has proven to be problem-
atic for potential debtors who do not speak English as their first language
since most approved counseling agencies offer counseling only in English.
147
D. Marriage and Dependents
BAPCPA does not remove any of the marriage benefits contained in the
Code, and it may indirectly provide additional benefits to married debtors. 
148
Some of the new BAPCPA requirements involving married debtors, their
dependents, and their household living arrangements are unclear. For exam-
ple, the means test formula relies on median family income - which is de-
rived from Census Bureau data. Because of inconsistencies in the definition
of "family" and "household," it is unclear whether all members that live in a
debtor's household are considered for the purposes of the means test, or
whether household will be limited to only those people in the debtor's house-
hold who are the debtor's legal dependents. 49 Since the means test considers
the debtor's household size at the time of the petition and debtors with house-
146. See Caroline E. Mayer, Bankruptcy Counseling Law Doesn't Deter Filings,
WASH. POST, Jan. 17, 2006, at Al (discussing early reports of Money Management
International Inc., one of the largest credit counseling organizations in the United
States, that stated that few people who received counseling could afford to repay their
debts outside of bankruptcy).
147. See In re Petit-Louis, 338 B.R. 132 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2006). While the OUST
website indicates that a number of providers offer counseling by telephone in
languages other than English, the providers' web sites typically are in English and do
not disclose which languages are available for telephonic session. See Executive
Office for U.S. Trustees (EOUST), http://www.usdoj.gov/ust/ (last visited Sept. 29,
2006). For example, while Green Path Debt Solutions is listed as providing
counseling in more than 150 languages, the information it provides on its web site is
in English and its "FAQ" page makes no mention of the availability of services in any
language other than English. See GreenPath Debt Solutions,
http://www.greenpathbk.com/faq-consumer.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2006).
148. See In re Parker, 336 B.R. 678 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006) (finding that Chapter
13 debtor-husband received benefit of automatic stay despite prior bankruptcy filings
that, under BAPCPA, otherwise would have denied him this benefit due to filing
jointly with his wife).
149. A debtor's household could be large if cohabitating heterosexual or homo-
sexual couples, parents, and the debtor's adult children are included. Compare 11
U.S.C. § 707(b)(2) (Supp. V 2005) with IRS - Collection Financial Standards,
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holds larger than four are allowed to depart from the IRS standards and add
$525 to their monthly expenses, 150 BAPCPA ostensibly provides additional
benefits to debtors who live in larger, non-traditional households which, ac-
cording to the census definition, should ignore blood lines or legal duties.
Debtors who live in non-traditional households, or who provide support
to family members even though they have no legal duty to do so also may
receive other benefits from BAPCPA. For example, BAPCPA lets debtors
continue to provide care support for their elderly or ill household members or
members of their immediate family.' 51 For the purposes of this provision,
BAPCPA uses an expansive definition of household member that includes
parents, grandparents, siblings, children, grandchildren, other dependents, or
spouse. 52 While BAPCPA does not explicitly give debtors the right to pro-
vide support for household members who are not their biological relatives, it
at least recognizes that debtors may live with or provide financial support to
more than just their spouse and children. 153
The means test may, however, harm debtors who receive financial sup-
port from family members who do not live in the same household. A debtor's
CMI includes income from all sources, including money others paid for the
household expenses of the debtor or the debtor's dependents on a regular
basis even if they have no legal duty to do so. 154 Because of this, family
members who have routinely given the debtor or her family cash to help her
meet her living expenses might find that this generosity increases the debtor's
CMI and, potentially, causes her to fail the means test.
Finally, BAPCPA also fails to curb other behavior which, pre-BAPCPA,
likely would have been viewed as abusive. For example, by relying on census
and IRS standards, BAPCPA perhaps inadvertently permits high income
debtors to have higher budgets than lower income debtors even if the high
income debtor lives in a smaller household. The IRS standards do not purport
to force delinquent taxpayers to make drastic lifestyle changes. These stan-
dards generally permit taxpayers to maintain their existing lifestyles and, for
that reason, are biased in favor of higher income taxpayers.155 Similarly,
150. 11 U.S.C. §§ 707(b)(6)(C), 1325(b)(3)(C).
151. Id. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(II).
152. As is true with so many BAPCPA provisions, it is unclear whether BAPCPA
treats these family members as legitimately included in the debtor's household, or
whether this group can be viewed as the debtor's immediate family. It is unlikely that
Congress meant the latter though the ambiguous provision can be read that way.
153. See also 11 U.S.C. § 362(l)(1)(B) (referring to "adult dependent of the
debtor").
154. 11 U.S.C. § 101(1OA)(B). Determining regularity might prove challenging if,
for example, debtor's adult children (or the parents of debtors) fail to keep close track
of how much money they give the debtor, or how many groceries or tanks of gas they
buy for the debtor.
155. For example, a taxpayer who lives alone and earns $5,834 monthly is entitled
to a higher monthly food budget ($483) than the food budget ($463) for a four person
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BAPCPA protects a debtor's lifestyle choice to send his child to a private or
parochial school because debtors can now include up to $1,500 in actual ex-
penses for their minor children to attend private or public school if they ex-
plain why those expenses are reasonable and necessary and not already in-
cluded in the IRS standards.
156
E. Debts
BAPCPA makes several debts that were dischargeable in pre-BAPCPA
Chapter 13 cases nondischargeable. For example, certain debts related to
taxes, fraud, embezzlement, breach of fiduciary, and willful or malicious
conduct that had been part of Chapter 13's "super" discharge are now nondis-
chargeable in both Chapter 7 and 13. 57 By clarifying that all student loans,
stipends, or educational scholarships - not just loans made or guaranteed by
governmental entities - are nondischargeable, BAPCPA also makes it harder
for debtors to discharge student loan debt in both Chapter 7 and 13.158
Because many in Congress concluded that too many people were using
credit cards irresponsibly, BAPCPA makes it harder to discharge certain
credit card debts. BAPCPA creates a presumption that credit card debts for
"luxury goods and services" that exceed $500 in the aggregate within 90 days
of the filing are nondischargeable. 159 The Code provides that luxury goods
and services do not include those reasonably necessary for the debtor and his
dependents' support. 160 However, BAPCPA also provides that debtors who
use a credit card to get a cash advance that exceeds $750 within 70 days of
household that earns $1,249 monthly. See Internal Revenue Service - National Stan-
dards for Living Expenses,
http://www.irs.gov/businesses/small/article/0,,id=104627,00.html (last visited Sept.
28, 2006). Likewise, a one person household that earns $5,834 monthly is entitled to a
monthly apparel and services budget of $216 while the budget for a four person
household that earns $5,800 monthly is $201. Id.
156. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(IV). By requiring debtors to show that private
school tuition payments are reasonably necessary, BAPCPA fails to resolve a hotly
disputed issue in pre-BAPCPA Chapter 13 cases: whether private education expenses
are reasonably necessary and can be deducted from disposable income. See Race
Matters I, supra note 1, at 1776 n.19; David S. Kennedy & R. Spencer Clift, III, Rea-
sonable and Necessary Expenses under Section 1325(b) of the Bankruptcy Code,
Postconfirmation Considerations, and the Effect of Conversion and Dismissal of
Chapter 13 Cases, 32 U. MEM. L. REv. 789, 808-12 (2002).
157. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a) (Supp. V 2005) with 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a)
(2000), amended by 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a) (Supp. V 2005).
158. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (Supp. V 2005).
159. Id. § 523(a)(2)(C)(i)(I). Pre-BAPCPA, the nondischargeability presumption
arose for luxury goods and services exceeding $1,255 within 60 days from the date of
filing. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(C)(i)(I) (2000), amended by 11 U.S.C. §
523(a)(2)(C)(i)(1) (Supp. V 2005).
160. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(C)(ii)(II) (Supp. V 2005).
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the filing will be presumed fraudulent and nondischargeable regardless of
whether the debtor used the money to buy luxury goods or goods that could
be considered more necessary. 61
Largely in response to criticisms that BAPCPA would harm women and
children,162 BAPCPA makes all domestic support obligations nondischarge-
able whether the obligations are owed to private creditors or governmental
entities, and also now prevents debtors from discharging non-support debts
that were dischargeable pre-BAPCPA. BAPCPA further increases the protec-
tions domestic support obligations receive in bankruptcy cases by giving
those debts first priority in payment in Chapter 7.163 Finally, debtors cannot
confirm a Chapter 13 plan unless support debts are paid in futll 64 and
BAPCPA excepts from the automatic stay garnishment or wage orders to




Early versions of BAPCPA were criticized because they appeared to
create a loophole that let debtors who owned mansions in states with unlim-
ited homestead exemptions keep those mansions.166 Indeed, the debtor could
161. Id. § 523(a)(2)(C)(i)(II). Pre-BAPCPA, these cash advances were nondis-
chargeable if they exceeded $1,215 within 60 days from the date of filing. In contrast,
§ 523(a)(2)(C) (2000), amended by 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(C) (Supp. V 2005), made
these debts dischargeable only if the purchases were for luxury goods.
162. Elizabeth Warren, Op-Ed., A Quiet Attack on Women, N.Y. TIMES, May 20,
2002, at A19.
163. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(1) (Supp. V 2005). Of course, that women and children
may be the first in line to collect is largely irrelevant in cases that are administratively
insolvent and have no assets to pay any unsecured creditors. See Elizabeth Warren,
What Is a Women's Issue? Bankruptcy, Commercial Law, and Other Gender-Neutral
Topics, 25 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 19, 37-41 (2002). Moreover, by placing mothers and
children ahead of the trustee who gets paid if he finds and liquidates non-exempt
property, BAPCPA somewhat decreases the trustee's incentive to gather and liquidate
assets. Id. at 40. In addition, because BAPCPA makes more debts nondischargeable in
both Chapter 7 and 13, especially in administratively insolvent cases women and
children may find themselves competing with sophisticated commercial creditors
(including credit card companies and student loan issuers) who have greater sources
to devote to debt collection than those available to most mothers and children. Id. at
37-41.
164. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(8).
165. Id. § 362(b)(2)(C).
166. See S. REP. No. 106-49, at 76 (1999); H.R. REP. No. 109-31, pt. 1, at 15-16
(2005), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 102 (discussing the "mansion loop-
hole"); see generally Margaret Howard, Exemptions Under the 2005 Bankruptcy
Amendments: A Tale of Opportunity Lost, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 397 (2005) (noting
[Vol. 71
30
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 71, Iss. 4 [2006], Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol71/iss4/5
RACE MATTERS
keep the mansion even if he moved to the state just to take advantage of the
state's generous exemption laws and purchased the mansion with non-exempt
funds that otherwise could have been used to pay creditors' debts. In partial
response to those criticisms, Congress made it somewhat harder for debtors
who had engaged in pre-petition exemption planning to keep expensive
homes.
Specifically, BAPCPA prevents debtors from using their new state's ex-
emption laws unless they lived in the state at least 2 years before filing for
bankruptcy. 167 BAPCPA also attempts to prevent debtors from buying an
expensive home in anticipation of filing for bankruptcy by providing that
debtors cannot claim a homestead exemption that exceeds $125,000 unless
the debtor acquired the property at least 1,215 days before filing for bank-
ruptcy. 168 In addition, if a debtor converted non-exempt property to exempt-
ible property within ten years of the bankruptcy filing with the intent to de-
fraud his creditors, BAPCPA limits his exemption to the value of his exempt
property before the conversion. 169 Finally, regardless of the debtor's intent,
BAPCPA caps a debtor's homestead exemption if the debtor added value in
excess of $125,000 to the homestead during a specified period before the
filing unless the value was transferred from another homestead in the same
state.170
BAPCPA also prevents serial filers from using bankruptcy to prevent
creditors from foreclosing on real property. Pre-BAPCPA, creditors argued
that debtors who had no intention of repaying their debts were allowed to file
multiple Chapter 13 petitions for the sole purpose of stopping a scheduled
foreclosure sale. 17 BAPCPA provides that, where a debtor has filed multiple
criticisms raised by bankruptcy experts). For examples of debtors who appeared to
take advantage of this mansion loophole, see Charles Jordan Tabb, The Death of Con-
sumer Bankruptcy in the United States, 18 BANKR. DEv. J. 1, 43 (2001) (discussing
the bankruptcy cases and mansions of actor Burt Reynolds, former Texas governor
John Connally, and former baseball commissioner Bowie Kuhn).
167. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(A). Specifically, this section provides that the law
governing the debtor's exemption will be where the debtor was domiciled for 730
days before the filing and, if the debtor lived in more than one state, where the debtor
lived for most of that period. Id. Debtors who have moved frequently during that
period would be limited to the federal bankruptcy exemptions. Id.
168. Id. § 522(p)(1).
169. Id. § 522(o).
170. Id. § 522(p)(1)(D) (making the specified period 1215 days). Generally, the
cap applies if the debtor added $125,000 in value to their home within 3.25 years of
filing for bankruptcy. An absolute $125,000 cap applies to debtors who have engaged
in certain acts (including securities fraud violations, or intentional torts that caused
serious bodily injury) unless the debtor proves that the home is reasonably necessary
for the debtor or his dependents' support. Id. § 522(q).
171. See Lisa A. Napoli, The Not-So-Automatic Stay: Legislative Changes to the
Automatic Stay in a Case Filed by or Against an Individual Debtor, 79 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 749, 753 (2005) (noting that debtors who have no intent to complete a Chapter 13
2006]
31
Dickerson: Dickerson: Race Matters in Bankruptcy Reform
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2006
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
bankruptcy petitions to protect the same real property and a prior bankruptcy
court entered an in rem order against the real estate within two years of the
current filing, the automatic stay will not prevent a creditor from seeking
possession of the property unless the debtor can establish good cause for the
current filing.' 
72
ii. Retirement or Employer-Provided Benefits
Though BAPCPA ostensibly was designed to make it harder for high in-
come debtors to shield their assets from creditors and avoid paying their
debts, BAPCPA expands the protections given to certain retirement accounts
and tax-qualified funds. For example, BAPCPA clarifies that debtors who
rely on the federal bankruptcy exemptions may exempt individual retirement
accounts as long as the exemption does not exceed one million dollars.'
7 3
BAPCPA also makes loans from pension, profit-sharing, or other tax-
sheltered plans nondischargeable' 74 and allows Chapter 13 debtors to con-
tinue to repay loans borrowed against a tax qualified pension plan without
violating the automatic stay.175 Similarly, BAPCPA excludes from a debtor's
Chapter 13 disposable income money the debtor uses to repay pension
loans, 176 which is a dramatic reversal from pre-BAPCPA practice.' 7 7 Like-
wise, Chapter 13 debtors may continue to make contributions to their em-
ployer's tax-qualified retirement and health insurance plans because those
amounts are excluded from disposable income, and BAPCPA also excludes
those amounts from the bankruptcy estate. 178
BAPCPA also adds protections for certain tax-qualified accounts that
were not specifically protected under prior law. For example, BAPCPA ex-
cludes from a debtor's bankruptcy estate funds she placed in an educational
retirement account or state tuition program at least a year before the filing for
plan nonetheless can stop an impending repossession or foreclosure sale simply by
paying the bankruptcy filing fee); Final Report of the Bankruptcy Foreclosure Scam
Task Force, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 1063 (1999) (discussing various schemes used to
delay/defraud creditors via serial filings and efforts to thwart this behavior); Aurora
Loan Servs. Inc. v. Amey (In re Amey), 314 B.R. 864, 866-70 (Bankr. N.D. Ga.
2004) (holding debtor's history of filing four separate Chapter 13 cases in two-year
period to prevent foreclosure sale warranted in rem relief from automatic stay).
172. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(20).
173. Id. § 522(n). The million dollar cap excludes rollover amounts and can be
lifted for most retirement accounts "if the interests of justice so require." Id.
174. Id. § 523(a)(18).
175. Id. § 362(b)(19).
176. Id. § 1322(f).
177. See, e.g., Kennedy & Clift, supra note 155, at 812-22 (discussing prior treat-
ment of pension assets and obligations pre-BAPCPA and noting that most courts
treated pension loan repayments as disposable income).
178. 11 U.S.C. § 541(b)(7).
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her children or grandchildren. 179 Similarly, BAPCPA specifies that health
insurance, disability insurance and health savings account expenses are rea-
sonably necessary expenses when performing the means test.
180
V. BAPCPA AND THE IDEAL DEBTOR
A. Income
Because of BAPCPA's requirement that all debtors participate in credit
counseling and because of the significantly higher filing fees, it is even more
important now that debtors have access to funds to pay for the costs of filing
for bankruptcy. 181 Likewise, the Byzantine maze of eligibility hurdles, and
pre-filing and post-filing reporting requirements make it all the more impor-
tant that debtors have access to counsel, or to someone who can explain these
new requirements.8 2 The Ideal Debtor post-BAPCPA still needs disposable
income to pay the increased fees and costs,183 but cannot have too much of it
without "flunking" the means test.
BAPCPA's means test is clearly designed to harm high-income debtors
and to push all debtors into longer Chapter 13 repayment plans. The means
test considers a debtor's current income as well as income the debtor received
over a five year period when calculating his CMI. Thus, a debtor who had a
high income four years before the bankruptcy filing but subsequently lost that
income might be denied relief in Chapter 7 if he is deemed to have non-
existent income. Of course, BAPCPA supporters and opponents alike con-
cluded that the means test would affect few debtors because most people who
file for bankruptcy have relatively low incomes and staggering debt bur-
179. Id. § 541(b)(5), (b)(6). There is a $5,000 cap for funds contributed between 1
and 2 years before the filing. Id. § 541(b)(5)(C), (b)(6)(C).
180. Id. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I).
181. Even if the debtor's filing fee is waived, filing pro se is not a realistic option.
There were very few pro se filers pre-BAPCPA, and that number likely will decrease
since bankruptcy petitions and schedules are even longer and more detailed than they
were under the pre-reform law, and the means testing formula is almost undecipher-
able. Moreover, even if the debtor files pro se, given the complexity of BAPCPA's
filing and reporting requirements, it is even more likely that a pro se petition will be
dismissed because of procedural defaults. See In re Bass, 2006 WL 1593978, slip op.,
at 2 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Jun. 6, 2006) (admitting that "the bankruptcy community,
attorneys, trustees, the court clerk's staff, and the court itself' failed to give pro se
debtor the information she needed to file her case); Andrea Coombes, Do-It-Yourself
Bankruptcy: Be Careful, WALL ST. J., Dec. 4, 2005.
182. See, e.g., In re Valdez, 335 B.R. 801, 803 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2005) (question-
ing whether Congress intended to harm poor, ignorant debtors who are unaware of
BAPCPA's counseling requirement).
183. Some contend that legal fees have increased considerably, perhaps as much
as 75%. See Coombes, supra note 180; Mike Nixon, Bankruptcy Law Reforms Punish
Lawyers, Middle Class, ST. LOUIS DAILY REc., Apr. 15, 2006.
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dens. 184 Nonetheless, because BAPCPA's goal is to deny Chapter 7 relief to
debtors - especially debtors with above-median income - and instead push
them into a Chapter 13 plan, debtors need a stable income to fund a plan that
likely will last for five years.
Debtors also need disposable income post-BAPCPA because the new
requirements BAPCPA imposes have affected the legal costs they must pay.
Bankruptcy judges, practitioners, and members of Congress who voted
against the bill all noted that the increased duties, reporting requirements, and
liabilities associated with any failure to perform the duties placed on lawyers
would cause legal fees to increase in all consumer cases. They also stressed
that these additional duties and requirements would decrease the number of
lawyers who would be willing to handle inexpensive consumer bankruptcy
cases. At least anecdotally, that seems to be what is happening. 185 In addition
to having to increase their fees, lawyers can no longer tell their clients to de-
lay paying certain debts in order to save money to pay the bankruptcy filing
fee and the lawyer's fee. BAPCPA explicitly states that private attorneys
cannot counsel their clients to incur debts in anticipation of a bankruptcy
filing even if the debtor intends to ultimately pay the debts. 186 Given this re-
striction on attorney speech, unless someone other than her private lawyer
tells the potential debtor to strategically stop paying some debts or she thinks
of this strategy on her own, the debtor may find herself unable to file for
bankruptcy unless she finds free or low-cost legal services. Alternatively, she
may file a pro se petition though it likely will be dismissed because of a fail-
ure to comply with BAPCPA's requirements. 87
184. See 151 CONG. REc. E737-02 (daily ed. Apr. 14, 2005) (statement of Rep.
Tiahrt). See also Personal Bankruptcy, supra note 130, at 24 (noting that, at most,
15% of Chapter 7 filers likely had the ability to repay more than 25% of their non-
priority unsecured debt); see Personal Bankruptcy Consumer Credit Crises, supra
note 35 (conceding that no more than 25% of consumers would have the ability to pay
more than one-third of their debts).
185. See Keith M. Lundin, Ten Principles of BAPCPA: Not What Was Advertised,
24 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 1, 69 (2005); Eugene R. Wedoff, Means Testing in the New §
707(b), 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 231, 277 (2005); Julie Reynolds, Debt Relief or Grief?
The Bankruptcy Act of 2005, DC BAR, Aug. 2005,
http://www.dcbar.org/for-lawyers/washington lawyer/august 2005/bankruptcy.cfm
(interviewing bankruptcy law professors and debtors' counsel); Democratic Dissent-
ing Views on S. 256 (2005),
http://www.house.gov/judiciary-democrats/s256dissentlO9cong.pdf. Of course, a
cynic would conclude that decreasing debtors' access to counsel was one of
BAPCPA's purposes.
186. 11 U.S.C. § 526(a)(4) (Supp. V 2005). In addition, courts have noted that
they can consider whether the debtor has paid or promised to pay an attorney when
deciding whether the debtor is entitled to a waiver of the filing fee. In re Nuttall, 334
B.R. 921, 924-25 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2005).
187. For example, the court in In re Bass, 2006 WL 1593978, slip op. (Bankr.
W.D. Tenn. Jun. 6, 2006), in dismissing the pro se debtor's case noted that she likely
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As noted above, pre-BAPCPA, debtors were accused of exempting
mansions from their creditors, or of converting non-exempt assets into ex-
emptible ones and avoiding debt repayment. Because of this, BAPCPA at-
tempts to make it harder for debtors to convert exemptible assets into non-
exempt wealth, typically in the form of real property. The homestead caps
and restrictions make it harder for debtors to engage in pre-filing exemption
planning. Furthermore, BAPCPA also harms opportunistic homeowners by
allowing courts to grant relief from the automatic stay if a debtor has filed
multiple bankruptcy petitions and a bankruptcy court entered an in rem order
against the property. 188 Together, these provisions narrow the gap between
homeowners and renters.
However, other BAPCPA provisions widen the wealth gap. Specifically,
BAPCPA allows all mortgage debt and all other secured debt payments to be
deducted in full when calculating CMI. In contrast, renters are limited to de-
ducting only the amount permitted by the IRS standards. 189 If a debtor's
rental expenses exceed the cap in the IRS standards, renters would be permit-
ted from deducting the full amount of their actual housing costs while home
owners would be allowed to deduct their full (secured) mortgage payments.190
As noted above, BAPCPA also gives greater protections to debtors who have
interests in retirement funds or who want to continue to make contributions
to, or repay loans borrowed against, their retirement funds. Given this,
BAPCPA makes it even more important that debtors have high - but ex-
emptible - wealth.
C. Marriage and Dependents
Married debtors continue to be favored post-BAPCPA. However, some
debtors with high necessary reasonable expenses may be harmed by
BAPCPA because the means test formula uses the IRS standards, not the
would have been entitled to free pro bono services, but that no one had told her of this
possibility. Ironically, if a debtor qualifies for legal aid or can find a pro bono attor-
ney, he could then be told to stop paying certain debts and save money to pay the
legal fees since those lawyers are not covered by the restriction on attorney speech. 11
U.S.C. § 526(a)(4).
188. BAPCPA also extends the period in which the trustee can recover funds that
a debtor contributed to an asset protection trust if there is proof that the debtor acted
with the actual intent to defraud creditors. Id. § 548(e).
189. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I) and Internal Revenue Service,
National Standards for Allowable Living Expenses,
http://www.irs.gov/businesses/small/article/0,,id=104696,00.html (last visited Oct. 1,
2006) (means test limitations on rental expenses) with 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(iii)
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broader "reasonably necessary" expense standard used pre-BAPCPA. These
standards are by design relatively low since they are used to determine a tax-
payer's ability to pay delinquent taxes. In general, the IRS standards allow
high income debtors to have higher budgets than lower income debtors. 191
However, unless the expense is a secured debt payment that can be paid in
full, a high but reasonable expense exceeding the IRS standards cannot be
deducted when calculating disposable income in Chapter 13 or when per-
forming the means test in Chapter 7.
BAPCPA may provide benefits to debtors who live in multi-generational
households or who provide support to people who are not legal dependents. 192
In other words, since the means test generally relies on Census Bureau stan-
dards, it arguably favors debtors who live in non-traditional households by
letting them deduct higher expenses related to the living expenses of non-
relatives or with relatives who are not their legal dependents. In addition,
BAPCPA lets debtors deduct actual reasonable and necessary expenses to
continue to provide care and support for elderly, chronically ill, or disabled
household members of immediate family members. 193 BAPCPA does not
require that the debtor have a legal duty to provide that support nor does it
explain the legal relationship the debtor must have to the household member.
BAPCPA thus appears to recognize that, increasingly, adult children are pro-
viding financial support for their elderly parents and that debtors may provide




The pre-BAPCPA Chapter 13 super-discharge has been substantially
eroded. Because virtually all student loan and domestic support debts are
nondischargeable, it is even more important that the post-BAPCPA Ideal
Debtor have only dischargeable debts.
191. See supra note 154.
192. This would especially be helpful, since a recent needs assessment study con-
ducted by a Chapter 13 Trustee's office found that many debtor households provide
support or care for people who are not immediate family members. Foley & Egner,
supra note 141, at 14-15.
193. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(II) (Supp. V 2005). By using the term "con-
tinuation," only debtors who provided this support pre-petition would be allowed to
claim these expenses in their bankruptcy cases. Id.
194. Id. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(II).
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VI. BAPCPA AND RACE
A. Anticipated Consequences
The post-BAPCPA Code contains many of the racial benefit disparities I
noted in Race Matters I. However, many of the Abusive Debtor attributes are
more likely to be found in whites. By revising the Code to harm the Abusive
Debtor, certain provisions of BAPCPA will have a disproportionately nega-
tive harm on the hypothetical white debtor. For example, BAPCPA's center-
piece is a means test that is designed to penalize higher income debtors.
Given the racial income gap, it is likely that the means test will have a dis-
proportionately negative effect on potential white debtors, even though most
have assumed that the means test will affect very few filers generally. In addi-
tion, because of the income gap, minorities are more likely than whites to
have incomes below 150% of the poverty level and, thus, to satisfy the re-
quirement for having their filing fees waived
White debtors also may be harmed by BAPCPA's treatment of "family"
and "household." Minority households are on average larger than white
households. As such, they may benefit from the means test formula's refer-
ence to the Census Bureau's definition of household. The post-BAPCPA
Code still does not explicitly define dependent to include all people with
whom the debtor has either a legal or familial relationship. Nonetheless, be-
cause the means test is partially defined by reference to households rather
than blood lines, it arguably benefits minority debtors since they are more
likely to live in multi-generational households. Similarly, since BAPCPA
uses the phrase "adult dependent of the debtor," it implicitly recognizes that
parents, or adult children of the debtor, may be dependent on the debtor for
financial support.
Since minorities appear to spend relatively more to support non-legal
dependents, BAPCPA may disproportionately benefit them by allowing them
to continue to pay the actual reasonable and necessary expenses for the sup-
port of elderly household members. In contrast, the means test calculates the
debtor's CMI by considering the amount family members regularly provide
for the debtor or debtor's dependents' household expenses. Because of this,
minority debtors who regularly receive assistance from family members, such
as grandparents who help pay their debtor-children's living expenses or chil-
dren who help pay their debtor-parent's living expenses, may be dispropor-
tionately harmed by this new definition.
Although the homestead exemption still exists, BAPCA eliminates some
of the homeowner bias by making it harder for debtors to purchase new ex-
pensive homes on the eve of bankruptcy and then shield that wealth from
their creditors. Unfortunately, certain aspects of BAPCPA exacerbates the
appearance that the Code favors the ultra-wealthy (white) debtor. BAPCPA
generally makes it easier for debtors to continue to contribute to pensions or
repay pension loans regardless of amount. Moreover, because Chapter 13
debtors are allowed to deduct even high secured debt payments to determine
20061
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disposable income, BAPCPA lets wealthier debtors continue to own expen-
sive homes and make mortgages on those homes rather than force them to sell
those homes and repay more of their debts. 195 In addition, because there are a
disproportionate number of whites who send their children to private schools,
BAPCPA's partial deduction for private school expenses likely will widen the
benefits gap.
196
BAPCPA's restriction on the types of debts that can be discharged is
also likely to have a larger, negative effect on minority debtors. The racial
income and wealth gaps cause minorities to incur significantly higher student
loan debt. Since BAPCPA expands the types of creditors who can prevent
loans from being discharged and continues to ignore the quality of education
debtor's received in return for the loans, this will likely have a disproportion-
ately negative effect on debtors who are minorities. Similarly, because blacks
and Hispanics have higher fertility rates, lower marriage rates, and conse-
quently are more likely to be required to pay child support, the fact that
BAPCPA makes virtually all domestic support obligations nondischargeable,
even if paid to a government, widens the benefits gap. Finally, the fact that
BAPCPA makes it harder to discharge credit card debt in Chapter 7 will
likely widen the Code's racially disparate impact because minorities tend to
have higher credit card debt than whites.
B. Unanticipated Consequences
BAPCPA clearly was designed to punish people who acted opportunis-
tically to abuse bankruptcy laws. Unfortunately, it likely will have harsh,
unintended racial consequences for largely innocent victims. On August 29,
2005 - after BAPCPA was enacted but before it became fully effective -
Hurricane Katrina devastated the Louisiana and Mississippi coasts. Many of
those affected by Katrina were forced to relocate and, thus, lacked access to
those financial records not destroyed by the flood waters. Katrina's survivors,
including many bankruptcy lawyers, were geographically displaced by the
hurricane. And, it was clear in the days immediately following the levee
broke that attorneys' offices and court buildings would be closed for
months. "'97
195. See Keith M. Lundin, Ten Principles of BAPCPA: Not What Was Advertised,
24 AM. BANKR. INST. J., 1, 68 (2005) ("Perversely, this use of the abuse test in chapter
13 makes the wealthiest debtors pay less than under existing law.").
196. See S.P. Broughman & Nancy L. Swaim, Characteristics of Private Schools
in the United States: Results From the 2003-2004 Private School Universe Survey 3
(2006), available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2006/2006319.pdf.
197. (187) See Brad Townsend & Lee Haycock, A Legal Quagmire Without
Precedent: Katrina's Aftermath Stymies Louisiana's Judicial System, DALLAS
MORNING NEws, Sept. 9, 2005, at IA, available at 2005 WLNR 24690496; Patti
Bond, Katrina: The Aftermath: Legal Affairs Put in Limbo: Officials Fear Some Re-
cords Didn't Survive, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Sept. 11, 2005, at 1G.
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Sensing the magnitude of the harm the residents of that region would
face, members of Congress proposed legislation within a week of the hurri-
cane that was designed to protect the families and small businesses who were
financially devastated by the hurricane. 198 This legislation would have al-
lowed Katrina survivors to do the following: file for bankruptcy under pre-
BAPCPA law, exclude disaster relief payments they received from CMI, and,
include expenses they incurred as a result of being a victim of a natural disas-
ter from CMI. The legislation also would have allowed courts to increase
Katrina survivors' monthly expenses and would have given courts the discre-
tion to extend certain time periods for Katrina survivors if their status as a
victim of a natural disaster necessitated an extension. 199 Other legislation
generally sought to delay BAPCP's effective date.2 ° °
BAPCPA's supporters' fervent determination to enact the law caused
them to oppose and ultimately defeat all legislative attempts to provide bank-
ruptcy relief to the survivors of Hurricanes Katrina or Rita.201 It is possible, of
course, that some of the displaced hurricane survivors did not need this legis-
lative relief because they had their financial records and filed for bankruptcy
in another region before BAPCPA's October 17 effective date. And those
survivors whose incomes were well below the poverty line likely would still
be entitled to a Chapter 7 discharge post-BAPCPA because they would not be
subjected to the means test. Still others may have had no need to file for
bankruptcy because they were so poor that they simply were judgment-proof
198. See Press Release, Eight Congressional District of New York,
Nadler, Conyers, Watt, Jackson Lee to Introduce Bill to Relieve Debt
Burden on Katrina Survivors, (Sept. 1, 2005), available at
http://www.house.gov/list/press/ny08_nadler/DebtreliefKatrina090105.html (express-
ing desire to prevent Hurricane Katrina survivors from harm, or an "unintended finan-
cial whammy" that might be caused by BAPCPA). See also Letter to Hon. David M.
Walker, Comptroller General (Oct. 18, 2005) (requesting study of BAPCPA's conse-
quences on Katrina's victims).
199. Hurricane Katrina Bankruptcy Relief and Community Protection Act of
2005, S. 1647, 109th Cong. (2005); Katrina Emergency Relief Act of 2005, S. 1637,
109th Cong. (2005).
200. Financial Safeguards for Hurricane Survivors Act of 2005, H.R. 3662, 109th
Cong. (2005); Hurricane Katrina Bankrtupcty Relief and Community Protection Act
of 2005, H.R. 3697, 109th Cong. (2005). Ironically, while Congress was originally
considering BAPCPA in 2005, one member of Congress offered an amendment to
protect the victims of natural disasters. H.R. REP. No. 109-31, pt. 1 (2005), as re-
printed in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88. That amendment, like virtually all others that would
have made it easier for people to avoid the effects of BAPCPA, was defeated without
debate. Id.
201. The only concession Congress made to recognize the devastation Katrina
caused was to authorize the bankruptcy court in New Orleans to hold court in Baton
Rouge. See Federal Judiciary Emergency Special Sessions Act of 2005, Pub. L. No.
109-63, § 152, 119 Stat. 1993, 1994-95.
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or they otherwise would not benefit from filing for bankruptcy. 202 Indeed,
some of the above-median income hurricane survivors may still have
"passed" the means test either because they had high expenses or non-priority
unsecured debts, or because they could convince the court, the US Trustee,
and their creditors that "special circumstances" rebutted the presumption of
abuse.
However, countless other hurricanes survivors no doubt failed to file for
bankruptcy relief before October 17 because either they could not find their
financial documents and would not be able to recreate them easily or quickly,
because there were no available lawyers, or simply because they were over-
whelmed by the other details in their dislocated lives. These potential filers
and others who may have consciously chosen not to file for bankruptcy be-
cause the full extent of their economic losses was not yet apparent may find
that they will be caught in the new trap Congress set for the Abusive Debtors.
For example, some Katrina survivors may be unable to rely on their new
state's exemption laws if they moved to a state with more favorable exemp-
tion laws, 20 3 Still other Katrina survivors may "flunk" the means test because
of their higher pre-Katrina earnings. While one would hope that above cir-
cumstances mean that Katrina survivors would be able to demonstrate "spe-
cial circumstances" and rebut any presumption of abuse, they could not sat-
isfy this requirement without providing documentation that itemizes their
expenses and income adjustments unless a court found some way to waive
this mandatory requirement.
20 4
Congress' refusal to waive BAPCPA's requirements for hurricane sur-
vivors also may lead to some absurd results. Assuming they have access to a
computer, the hurricane survivors could just as easily satisfy the mandatory
credit counseling requirement by getting "counseling" on the Internet whether
they lived in New Orleans or Houston. It is hard to imagine, though, what is
gained by forcing Chapter 7 debtors who are Katrina survivors to participate
in pre-petition credit counseling that explains "the consequences of bank-
ruptcy, such as the potentially devastating effect it can have on their credit
rating. 2 °5 It is quite likely that they all are fully aware of those consequences
202. But cf. Robert M. Lawless, Bankruptcy Filing Rates After a Major Hurri-
cane, 6 NEV. L.J. 4 (2005) (empirical analyses of bankruptcy filing rates following
hurricanes).
203. This is a likely possibility since so many Katrina survivors moved to Texas,
which essentially has an unlimited homestead exemption. See Rick Lyman, Reports
Reveal Katrina's Impact on Human Landscape, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2006, at Al
(discussing increase in Houston population caused by hurricane evacuees).
204. See generally JEWELER, supra note 112 (discussing inflexibility of BAPCPA
requirements).
205. H.R. REP. No. 109-31, pt. 1, at 18 (2005), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N.
88, 103 (explaining need for pre-petition credit counseling).
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relating to their current economic plight. 206 Likewise, one wonders how much
Katrina survivors would benefit from post-petition financial management
training in Chapter 13. They likely do not need "guidance about how to man-
age their finances, so that they can avoid future financial difficulties"
20 7
unless that guidance also explains ways to prevent a levee from breaking and
flooding almost an entire major metropolitan area or it explains how they
could prevent a repeat of the federal government's abysmal response to a
national disaster.
20 8
Fortunately, the Office of the United States Trustee ("OUST") provided
some early relief to Katrina victims. Specifically, OUST agreed not to file
enforcement motions against Katrina victims who could not provide wage or
income documentation. It also agreed that income loss, expense increases,
and other financial problems caused by Katrina would constitute special cir-
cumstances that could rebut the presumption of abuse in the means test.
209
OUST also temporarily waived the credit counseling requirement for debtors
who lived in the districts affected by Katrina.
210
The full extent of Katrina's economic harm to the residents of the Gulf
Coast has yet to be determined. However, given the socioeconomic profile of
one of the largest cities affected by Katrina (New Orleans), it is likely that
blacks will suffer disproportionately greater economic losses than whites.
Specifically, before Katrina caused her widespread dislocation, 67% (or
roughly 325,940) of the approximately 484,000 New Orleans residents were
211black. Of course, not all of the black residents would necessarily benefit
from filing for bankruptcy since almost 28% of all residents (and 35% of
206. See In re Petit-Louis, 344 B.R. 696, 701 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2006) (suggesting
that the counseling requirement "is the equivalent of requiring a person who has suf-
fered a heart attack to listen to a lecture on exercise, diet and the evils of cholesterol
before allowing such person to undergo open heart surgery").
207. H.R. REP. No. 109-31., pt. 1, at 18 (2005) (explaining need for Chapter 13
financial management courses).
208. A FAILURE OF INrHIATIvE, H.R. REP. No. 109-396 (2006).
209. Press Release, United States Department of Justice, U.S. Trustee Program
Announces Enforcement Guidelines for Bankruptcy Debtors Affected by Natural
Disasters (Oct. 5, 2005), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/ust/eo/public-affairs/press/docs/pr20051005.htm.
210. See Press Release, United States Department of Justice, U.S. Trustee Pro-
gram Announces Approval of Debtor Education Course Providers for Bankruptcy
Filers and Waiver of Debtor Education Requirement (Oct. 7, 2005), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/ust/eo/public-affairs/press/docs/pr20051007.pdf.
211. See U.S. Census Bureau Website, State and County QuickFacts: Orleans
Parish, Louisiana, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/22/22071.html (last visited
Oct. 1, 2006). In contrast, a recent Census Bureau study reveals that the areas hit by
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212blacks) lived below the federal poverty line. Moreover, while it is too early
to determine the precise economic impact Katrina had by race, a recent study
indicates that Katrina's impact in both Louisiana and Mississippi was dispro-
portionately borne by blacks, renters, the poor, and those who were unem-
213ployed. Again, while there is no indication that Congress refused to pro-
vide even temporary legislative relief to Katrina's survivors because, as the
rapper Kanye West declared about President George W. Bush, they didn't
"care about black people,' 21 4 BAPCPA's post-enactment effects continue to
show why race matters in bankruptcy reform.
VII. CONCLUSION
On the surface, there is nothing overtly "racial" about BAPCPA or the
pre-BAPCPA Code and both appear to be race neutral.2 15 Certainly, there is
no indication that the members of Congress who voted for BAPCPA or re-
fused to enact the Katrina bankruptcy relief measures exhibited any overt
animus against racial minorities. Indeed, though everyone concedes that few
people of any race will "fail" the test, because minority income is relatively
lower than white income, means testing theoretically harms whites more than
minorities.
For some, this would end any racial analysis of BAPCPA. However,
whether Congress enacted BAPCPA knowing or hoping that it would have
disproportionately negative effects on minorities is largely irrelevant given
this country's checkered racial past. The racialist economic patterns caused
by historical social and institutional practices and habits make it imperative
that politicians and scholars consider whether facially neutral laws have ra-
cially disparate effects and avoid enacting or revising laws that perpetuate
212. State and County QuickFacts, supra note 210. To use an example, 98.7% of
the Lower Ninth Ward was black and 99.9% of the homes in that area were heavily
damaged. More than one-third (36.4%) of the residents in that area lived below the
poverty line and, thus, likely would not benefit from filing for bankruptcy. Even if
they did choose to file for bankruptcy, most would undoubtedly "pass" the means test.
See John R. Logan, The Impact of Katrina: Race and Class in Storm-Damaged
Neighborhoods at 11, http://www.s4.brown.edu/Katrina/report.pdf.
213. Id. at 1, 7 (stating that 45.8% of the heavily damaged areas were in predomi-
nately black neighborhoods while only 26.4% of the undamaged areas were in black
neighborhoods).
214. See Lisa de Moraes, Kanye West's Torrent of Criticism, Live on NBC, WASH.
POST, Sept. 3, 2005, at COI, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/09/03/AR2005090300165.html.
215. But cf. Donald Korobkin, Bankruptcy Law, Ritual, and Performance, 103
COLuM. L. REv. 2124, 2140-42, 2156-57 (2003) (contending that Southern legislators
supported the abolition of debtors' prisons and a broader bankruptcy discharge to
protect white debtors from the "slavery" of debt).
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economic racial disparities. Congress failed to do this when it enacted
BAPCPA. One hopes that the next time members-of Congress consider revis-
ing bankruptcy laws, they will remember that race matters.
43
Dickerson: Dickerson: Race Matters in Bankruptcy Reform
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2006
44
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 71, Iss. 4 [2006], Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol71/iss4/5
